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 Preface 
Milestones are placed along the road to provide reference points reassuring the traveller that 
the right path is being followed. Gaining knowledge often resembles a journey and on this 
journey, I am the traveller in search of knowledge. This Master of Arts is my milestone, and 
while working on my thesis I have found myself asking: how do we organize our complex 
societies? This broad question is at the core of social development. Society, science and 
technology are three intertwined forces that may create progress, innovation and new 
realities and challenge existing ideas of power structures. To study politics is to study 
progress. This is a study of politics in the making. The point of departure is the archival 
records at the Norwegian Ministry of Finance. 
I am grateful to a number of people and institutions for their help in completing this 
thesis. I would like to thank the Ministry of Finance for opening their archives, Jorunn 
Bødtker, Deputy Director General of the Ministry of Finance, and Einar Lie, Professor of 
Economic History at the University of Oslo. I am grateful for the discussions, authoritative 
guidance and enthusiastic feedback from my supervisor, Professor Kristin Asdal. My friend 
of heart in life; I am grateful for your patience and love. Eline, my curious little one – stay 
that way forever. Mom, you inspire me. I dedicate this work to my late mother in law for her 
encouragement and support. 
 
 
 
 
 Abstract 
This thesis is a document study and an analysis of archival records at an institution key to 
the development of environmental policy in Norway. It is through a historical perspective 
that I enter the Norwegian Ministry of Finance. The time period investigated are the few 
years from 1989-1992. These years are fundamental in environmental politics in Norway. 
The point of departure is the promising use of financial instruments, such as green taxes, in 
environmental policy. The realization of the impact on Norwegian economy in case of an 
international climate agreement leads to the production of a new level of politics within the 
national environmental politics. The international level was established within the national 
level. I will argue this was done as a solution to the underlying controversy between 
conflicting economic and environmental goals. In order to do this political practice is studied 
by using theoretical resources from science studies, controversy studies and the concept of 
closure. I have chosen several cases that I find characteristic to illustrate the process from a 
focus on national green taxes to the suggestion of a global clearing house as a solution.  
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1. Introduction and rationale 
The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) was established as a 
result of General Assembly Resolution 38/161 in 1983.
1
 In the words of Gro Harlem 
Brundtland, Chairman of the Commission, ”a global agenda for change” was what the 
Commission had been charged with formulating.
2
 The overall task of the mandate was to 
propose long-term environmental strategies to achieve sustainable development by the year 
2000 and beyond. The result of this work is best known in Norway as 
“Brundtlandkommisjonen”, the World Commission‟s Report of 1987; Our Common Future. 
It placed global warming on the global agenda.
3
 Carbon dioxide (CO2) produced by 
combusting fossil fuels was pinpointed and given a salient role due to its contribution to 
global warming.
4
 Other climate gases are mentioned in the World Commission‟s report, but 
CO2 came to be regarded as the main threat causing global warming. In accordance with 
recommendations in Our Common Future, the UN decided to organize a global conference 
to develop a universal declaration and convention on sustainable development, the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.
5
 
These events constitute the external frames of this thesis.  
                                              
1
 WCED 1987 p. 352. 
2
 Ibid. p. ix Chairman`s foreword by Gro Harlem Brundtland. 
3
 Nilsen 2001 p. 95. 
4
 WCED 1987 p. 172. 
5
 At the UNCED in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, three international treaties were showcased; The 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD), and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD). These treaties have 
been known since as the Rio Conventions (UNFCCC 2009). I will use the term “Rio Conventions” 
when referring to the UNCED in the following. 
2 
 
This thesis investigates how the World Commission‟s report was reflected upon in 
terms of national environmental challenges in Norway. The Norwegian Government 
endorsed the report, but how did following up the World Commission‟s recommendations 
influence national strategies? The international aspect became more prominent in Norwegian 
politics before the conference, not by transferring national politics into international politics, 
but by incorporating international politics into national Norwegian policies.  
The point of departure for this thesis comprises archival records at the Ministry of 
Finance.
6
 This thesis investigates the time period when national financial instruments, such 
as green taxes, seemed to be a promising means in environmental politics. Nevertheless, a 
change in policy leads way for the international environmental politics to become more 
visible within national environmental politics. National financial instruments, such as green 
taxes are replaced with ideas and instruments suitable for global co-operation and global 
politics. In which ways did the Ministry of Finance take part in developing this 
environmental policy? The structure of the analysis reflects two lines that characterize 
Norwegian environmental politics in the period 1989-1992. Accordingly, this is a 
chronological narrative starting in 1989 and involving national assessments of financial 
instruments in environmental politics, and it develops through a period of transition when an 
international focus was emerging and Norwegian environmental politics had to find a 
solution to meet both international and national expectations in environmental politics. The 
scope of this thesis ends in 1992 with the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro the same year. 
                                              
6
  The Ministry of Finance was named the Ministry of Finance and Customs until 01.01.2000. I have 
chosen to use the current name of the ministry in this thesis. 
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1.1 Framing national environmental politics 
When studying such a process within environmental politics, it would be easy to approach 
the area by studying actors that are obviously close to the issue. Examples of milieux 
possessing environmental knowledge are the Ministry of the Environment, public-research 
institutes possessing climate expertise or environmental movements, as far as both politics 
and environmental issues are concerned. But is this an all too obvious point of entry?  
It is the Ministry of Finance, in fact, that has been fundamental in shaping Norwegian 
environmental politics both as institution per se and as an institution possessing human 
capital in the form of economic expertise. The ministry is the key fiscal policy agent and is 
responsible, among other things, for preparing the annual Central Government Budget 
Proposal. At the same time, it has a consultative and coordinating function in relation to the 
other sector ministries` budgetary work. Due to its two-fold role, the ministry holds 
institutional power while being a supra-ministry above the others.
7
 Not just the institution 
itself was influential: economists and the economics they practised at the ministry could 
bring special influence to bear. The expertise of and at the ministry has enjoyed, and still 
enjoys, recognition and trust in developing modern societal structures.
8
 Such intertwined 
professional and institutional frames came to shape the climate politics of the initial years of 
the 1990s. The Ministry of Finance has earlier been key to the process of creating 
environmental policy. Viewed from within, what role did the ministry hold in this process?  
                                              
7
 Asdal 1998 pp. 10-12, 181. 
8
 In Yngve Nilsen‟s PhD thesis, his main theme is the interaction of expert knowledge and politics 
within Norwegian climate research and climate politics from the 1970s up to 1998 with an emphasis 
on the late 1980s and 1990s (Nilsen 2001). 
4 
 
Financial instruments began to be employed in environmental politics in the late 
1980s, and in 1989 these instruments was established in political rhetoric. A comprehensive 
study was conducted by Statistics Norway (SSB) to shed light on environmental political 
goals while sustaining economic growth. The SIMEN project directly followed up the World 
Commission‟s report.9 The recommendation of the SIMEN report was a radical change in 
the system of taxes and charges. The report concluded that it would be possible to reduce 
CO2 emissions to their level in 1987 by the year 2000. This is the background framing 
Norwegian environmental politics in 1989. Financial instruments seem the solution to 
environmental challenges.
10
 The scope of SIMEN was national, and the timeframe was up to 
the year 2000.  
In the end of the 1980s climate politics was just beginning to be a broad topic in 
politics. The Norwegian Government wanted to integrate environmental politics with 
economic politics in line with the recommendations of the World Commission.
11
 
Environmental taxes seemed promising; indeed, they are mentioned as part of the “solution” 
to environmental challenges in the SIMEN report, in the Governments Long-Term 
Programme 1990-1993, and in the white paper on the way in which Norway should follow 
up the World Commission‟s recommendations. But, practical politics was hard to reach. This 
is the background for my study. Nevertheless, as early as the Long-Term Programme, it is 
                                              
9
 SIMEN is a Norwegian acronym for ”Studier av Industri, Miljø og Energi”; i.e. ” Studies of 
Industry, Environment and Energy” (SSB 1989 p. 1). 
10
 In Marit Reitans PhD thesis one of her areas of investigation is financial instruments, the 
introduction of CO2 taxation. Reitan`s thesis is a comparative study of the environmental politics in 
the 1970s and between 1989-1996 (Reitan 1998). 
11
 St. meld. nr. 4 (1988-89) pp. 22-23. 
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clear that there were conflicting goals between environmental and economic ambitions.
12
 In 
the white paper pertaining to Norway‟s follow-up of the World Commission‟s 
recommendations, the ambition to reduce emissions was considerably lower than what was 
suggested as possible by the SIMEN report.
13
 I am analyzing this specific process of politics 
and the production of another solution to environmental challenges than environmental taxes 
that were the most prominent solutions at the time. 
Viewed in retrospect, in 1992 Norway had established an international climate 
policy. The wide use of environmental taxes was crumbling; “Norway‟s international view” 
had taken a hold.
14
 In 1992, Norway was about to renounce its ambitious climate goal to 
stabilize CO2 emissions to their level in 1989 by the year 2000.
15
 These are important events. 
Within Norwegian environmental politics, the period of the few years from 1989 to 1992 is 
key to the country‟s development of climate politics. To understand what happened in this 
relatively short period, a knowledge of the 1970 and 1980s debate on administration of 
natural resources is of importance.
16 
  
                                              
12
 PA 1988-1989, arkivboks nr. 7, arkivmappe 102.30 Langtidsprogrammet 1990-1993 generelt, brev 
fra SSB til str Fd 02.01.1989; PA 1988-1989, arkivboks nr. 7, arkivmappe 102.30 
Langtidsprogrammet 1990-1993 generelt, brev fra Norges Bank til str Fd 29.12.1988; PA 1988-1989, 
arkivboks nr. 7, arkivmappe 102.30 Langtidsprogrammet 1990-1993 generelt, telefax fra Moe og 
Andersen til PA 28.12.1988. 
13
 St. meld. nr. 46 (1988-89) pp. 10, 58. 
14
 I have put “Norway‟s international view” in inverted commas to underline the development of a 
phenomenon known in the literature as “Norges syn”. In the following I shall use “Norway‟s view” 
when I refer to the formation and development of Norway‟s international climate policy.   
15
 In the summer of 1989, the Storting agreed upon a national goal of stabilizing CO2-emissions. In 
NOU 1992:3, the Government was recommended to drop this ambition (NOU 1992:3 pp. 17-18).   
16
 Kristin Asdal uses the term “scarce resources”, ”Knappe ressurser; Økonomenes grep om 
miljøfeltet”, as title on her book on Norwegian environmental politics, economists and natural 
resources in 1970s and 1980s (Asdal 1998). 
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1.2 Avoiding conflict by producing a new level 
The international political community‟s interest in environmental issues was growing. The 
appointment of the World Commission and the UN`s decision to organize a global 
conference on sustainable development are just two examples. This emerging international 
interest in the environment originated in established international institutions such as the 
UN, the OECD and the EU. However, national Norwegian environmental policy became 
open and unclear during this process. Ambitious goals were set to achieve national 
environmental goals while an awareness increased of the economic repercussions of an 
international climate agreement, especially concerning the future value of Norwegian 
petroleum.  
 The World Commission underlined CO2 as the main climate gas contributing to 
global warming, while the UNCED aimed for an international agreement concerning 
reductions of the combustion of fossil fuels. Norway had large emissions of CO2 annually 
due to petroleum production: at the same time, the country had a very ambitious goal to 
stabilize its CO2-emissions. A high degree of uncertainty characterized environmental 
politics at this point in time. How was the international to be reflected in national 
environmental politics in Norway?  
What I will demonstrate is that in this process there was an underlying controversy 
that never really broke the surface reflected in the conflicting goals between economic and 
environmental ambitions. The Ministry of Finance has traditionally treated economic growth 
and environmental protection as independent of each other. The controversy lies in 
administrating both growth and protection. The solution that gained a salient role is the 
production of an international focus in national environmental politics. The national level did 
not disappear; rather, the international level was made within the national. The latent 
7 
 
controversy never breaks to the surface: it is handled internally in the ministries. National 
environmental politics are made governable at an international level; this can be described as 
a process involving one area of politics closing, while another opens. At the same time, open 
conflict is avoided. Later in the thesis I will attend to this point in my analysis of the process. 
The positioning that took place in order for the nation to get the best out of an international 
climate agreement did not become the main focus until later.  
Politics in the making, as the title of this thesis suggests, underlines the approach of 
this study.
17
 Political practices are studied closely and directly. I have chosen to explore the 
Ministry of Finance, though not necessarily as one united unit. Rather, individual 
departments within the ministry and individuals to some extent contributed to the formation 
of climate politics. Stories have been selected so as to be able to perceive a spectrum of the 
differing ideas and realities found within the Ministry of Finance and, to a certain extent, 
within other sector ministries as well.  
 
                                              
17
 Here I draw on the expression made famous in STS literature by Bruno Latour`s (1987) book, 
Science in Action. 
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2. Theoretical resources and methodology 
Entering the realm of politics necessitates an interest in and ambition to understand how 
issues are formed and come into being. It is not party-political programmes I wish to 
emphasize, but how the technologies of economics work to produce politics and the 
formation of political issues. The theories I briefly outline below are resources to lean on. 
Although we may know the outcome, how can we understand the process that brought us 
there? As Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman have so succinctly put it when they 
announced their aim in their fundamental book within Science and Technology Studies 
(STS): “Our question is, what shapes the technology in the first place, before it has 
„effects‟?”.18 This implies looking at the technological processes in progress before they 
have ended or been black-boxed.
19
 I have chosen to follow the same strategy in investigating 
politics in the making. There was an open, unsolved situation in environmental politics at the 
beginning of the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. Conflicting goals within 
economic and environmental politics contributed to this situation. Although different 
                                              
18
 Asdal, Brenna and Moser referring to MacKenzie, Donald and Judy Wajcman (1985) The Social 
Shaping of Technology; how the refrigerator got its hum. (Asdal, Brenna, Moser 2007 b p. 20). For a 
further reading of the confrontation with technological determinism: MacKenzie, Donald and Judy 
Wajcman (1985) The Social Shaping of Technology; how the refrigerator got its hum. Milton Keynes 
: Open University Press, and Bijker, Wiebe E., Thomas Hughes and Trevor Pinch (1987). The Social 
Construction of Technological Systems new directions in the sociology and history of technology. 
Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press. 
19
 Black box is a term describing a fact or an artifact as “inevitable”, as something taken for granted. 
To be able to investigate how consensus occurs, we need to open the black box to reveal its inner 
workings. Further reading in Pinch, Trevor J. and Wiebe E. Bijker (1987) in The Social Construction 
of Facts and Artifacts: Or how the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might 
Benefit Each Other in  Bijker, W. E., Hughes, T. P. and Pinch, T.; The Social Construction of 
Technological Systems. New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology. Cambridge, 
Mass. : MIT Press. 
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alternatives did appear to solve this dilemma, the solution did not emerge at once. At one 
point, one specific solution became salient, the era of an uncertain and open situation closed. 
The emergence of an international focus within national environmental politics stabilized the 
situation. Although the situation stabilized, it was difficult to re-open. The moment of 
closure had passed and there was a new regime or new focus in environmental politics. I 
have paid special attention to controversy and controversial stages in the process of 
producing new administrative politics.
20
  
In controversy studies, specific empirical studies are at the core of knowledge. This 
specific controversy, however, never reaches surface, but is instead avoided and bypassed by 
establishing the international level within the national one. The focus shifted and the 
arguments associated with the national ambitions, goals and reasoning fell away due to 
international concerns. This specific process was handled internally at the Ministry of 
Finance in an internal ministerial process. My approach, to be able to open up and 
investigate this matter, consists of studying internal processes within the ministries with the 
archives at the Ministry of Finance as the primary source of data. Although this thesis has 
been narrowed down to focus specifically on the archives of the ministry, the material 
indicates that other ministries also took part in influencing the development.  
This thesis can be read as part of the new direction in science studies away from 
science internal studies, towards an ”outwards” approach involving empirical studies of 
                                              
20
 For a further reading of controversy studies: T. Brante, Thomas, S. Fuller and W. Lynch (Eds.), 
Controversial Science. From Content to Contention. New York : State University of New York Press 
and Sundqvist, Gøran (1991). Vetenskapen och miljøproblemen – en expertsociologisk studie. 
Department of Sociology, University of Gothenburg. 
  
10 
 
politics.
21
 I borrow resources from constructivist studies to explain politics as a process of 
closure of an area of discourse. Economic politics can help shape environmental issues and 
environmental politics as a whole. But how can nature be made governable by economic 
reasoning? Through numbers and measurability, nature is made governable by becoming a 
part of economic politics. Therefore, the object of study is how economic politics contributes 
to shaping environmental issues and environmental politics. In the following, I outline the 
theoretical concepts and resources I rely on in analyzing the empirical material. Due to the 
complexity of the material, the theories are not explicitly treated in the analysis: they are the 
basis for understanding the material within an STS approach.    
2.1 An empirical study of politics in practice 
Using the image of a funnel as a metaphor, I place this thesis within the field of Science and 
Technology Studies (STS) and, further, within constructivist studies. Inspired by Thomas 
Kuhn, the sociologists of science were determined to show empirically what Kuhn had 
suggested conceptually: that knowledge-making was a social process.
22
 This marked a 
turning point: instead of science being regarded as rational, a shift took place towards 
science being regarded as socially constructed. Ethnomethodology became an inspiration for 
science studies and especially Laboratory Studies.
 23
 The latter emphasized empirical studies 
                                              
21
 Asdal 2004 pp.11-14 and Marres, Noortje (2007). The Issues Deserve More Credit: Pragmatist 
Contributions to the study of Public Involvement in Controversy. Social Studies of Science 2007; 
37/5 pp. 759-780. 
22
 Thomas S. Kuhn revolutionized the way we think about relations between society, science and 
technology. With his book, he is often viewed as one of the founders of Science and Technology 
Studies (STS). Kuhn, Thomas S. (1962). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago : University 
of Chicago Press. 
23
 Ethnomethodology: the study of the way people make sense of their everyday lives, meaning there 
is no a priori: the social order is something always under construction (Asdal, Brenna, Moser 2007 p. 
11 
 
of scientific practice with the laboratory as an area of research.
24
 In investigating the content 
of politics, I draw on methods used in science studies to explore directly the archival 
material, whilst I retain an open mind with the aim of understanding the actors involved in 
the process of (climate) politics in the making. To be able to make use of the theoretical 
resources stemming from science studies, viewing the term technology in a broad 
perspective is fundamental. In politics there is professional expertise, especially within the 
Ministry of Finance which is explicitly responsible for state finances and with economists 
highly represented as senior civil-servants. Politicians lean on science in decision-making, 
and in this way one might say that politics is partly technical. Economic knowledge is 
technical knowledge. One could say that at the Ministry of Finance, economics is both 
science and technology. Public administration is an area of, if not independent, then great 
political importance due to professional knowledge and expertise within the ministries.
25
 
Experts are linked to policy and politics, but with their base in science.
26
 It is not my 
intention to argue that expert knowledge is an attempt to enforce a technocracy; it is more an 
attempt to understand how this specific knowledge contributes to the development of politics 
and areas of administration. In any profession, knowledge has both a tacit and an explicit 
form.
27
 The idea of tacit knowledge can be linked to the philosopher Michael Polanyi who 
                                                                                                                                           
14, and Encyclopædia Britannica 2009). For further readings of Laboratory Studies, see: Latour, 
Bruno and Steve Woolgar (1979). Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, and Latour, Bruno (1987). Science in Action; How to Follow Scientists 
and Engineers through society. Milton Keynes : Open University Press. 
24
 Asdal, Brenna and Moser 2007 p. 14. 
25
 Asdal 2004 p. 15. 
26
 Brante 1993 pp. 181-182. 
27
 Nonaka 1991 p. 98; Asdal refer to tacit knowledge in Asdal 1998 pp. 16-17. 
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has said: ”we can know more than we can tell”.28 Practices and studying actors` practices are 
fundamental in science studies. Therefore, in studying economic politics it is crucial to 
understand the specific ways economic reasoning is done in practice.  
2.1.1 Studies of controversy 
Political decision-making is partly based on expert knowledge from science. The expert 
knowledge is, in this case, economic reasoning and economic knowledge traditions. Within 
STS controversy studies is understood as an attempt to open up agendas hidden to the world, 
and understand how arguments are built up.
29
 There are no neatly opposing sides in this 
controversy, as one may expect. The ministry‟s dilemma was to find a solution that balanced 
Norwegian national environmental efforts while ensuring good industrial frameworks and 
secure the future wealth potential that lies in oil and gas. In the SIMEN project this was 
proven possible within national environmental politics. Nevertheless, a new strategy was 
developed due to the emerging focus on and expectations of a forthcoming international 
climate agreement aiming at reducing the combustion of fossil fuels. By producing an 
international level in Norwegian environmental politics, it was possible to avoid dispute and 
confrontation. I will argue that the international level became a way of handling the national 
level. There was generally a high degree of consensus vis-à-vis the reduction of CO2-
emissions. The goals of politicians, environmental movements, industry and, to a certain 
extent, economists, all seemed to pull towards the same goal of environmental 
                                              
28
 Polanyi 2000 p. 16. 
29
 Brante 1993 p. 186, and n. No. 20.  
13 
 
sustainability.
30
 But in this story one of the actors, the economists within the Ministry of 
Finance, take part in altering the outcome by the way they practice their theoretical 
reasoning. The controversy becomes an internal controversy within the ministry, handled 
within the ministry: it rarely reaches the surface. When international climate agreements 
were being negotiated, the concern was still national, but the policy level was international. 
It was not just levels that were being created, but the content of the levels were given priority 
in the process of climate politics. Norwegian environmental politics became international. 
But with which tools and technology?  
Economists, like other “scientists”, need to convince the appropriate people of their 
claims, and therefore rhetoric mediates actions such as work practices between the reader 
and the material world.
31
 It is just within the archival records at the Ministry of Finance it is 
possible to do a study of arguments, discussions and disagreements internally in the ministry 
in the latent controversy in this matter. The open, unsolved situation that gradually closes in 
on one solution, the production of an international level, can be understood, I argue, by 
applying methods of controversy studies. Access to this material is unique, and STS 
theoretical resources on controversy studies seem an appropriate way to understand how the 
issue emerges, develops and closes.
32
   
                                              
30
 Callon 2007/1986 has provided a theoretical framework in his article on scallops in the St. Brieuc 
Bay called sociology of translation. One main point is how the different goals of the entities all pull 
in the same direction (Callon 2007 pp. 59-65). 
31
 Sismondo discusses controversies and rhetoric as a tool of persuasion in controversy (Sismondo 
2004 pp. 100-103). 
32
 Brante 1993 p. 179. 
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2.1.2 Closure by redefining the focus 
Environmental policy develops in part from a concern for pollution challenges faced 
nationally. With which arguments and reasoning is one level prioritized over another? 
Economic expertise agreed that the consequences of an international agreement were 
nonetheless prioritized, within the context of a concern for national interests. The discourse 
of environmental taxes thus closes. “Closure in technology involves stabilization of an 
artifact and the disappearance of problems”, Bijker argue.33 In this way it is the closure of a 
debate when it “closes” on one solution and erodes other arguments on other possible 
solutions.  The concern for an environmental policy within the borders of Norway expanded; 
though the concern remained national, the environmental policy became global. There was 
no definitive moment of closure in the case of environmental taxes. Moreover, there was a 
sliding transition in focus in public practice and administration. Even in the Government‟s 
Long-Term Programme, there were clearly conflicting goals in terms of environmental and 
economic politics. Was this a point at which closure started? Bijker has promoted a 
development of closure, the concept of stabilizing, involving several technologies living in 
symbioses side by side.
34
 The interpretation of one discussion, the international one, 
predominates and the debate closes – closure. 
This was not just the closure of an area of discourse: the discourse closed in on one 
solution. The controversial change in the taxation system to meet national environmental 
challenges was no longer a priority. The solution to environmental challenges was no longer 
financial instruments at a national level. By redefining what the main challenge in national 
                                              
33 Bijker and Pinch 1987 p. 44. 
34
 Ibid. pp. 44-46, and Bijker`s lecture given at the TIK centre, 08.09.2008. 
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environmental politics was, and by establishing an international level within the national 
level, the debate was stabilized. The act of closure was effectuated by a redefinition of 
priorities.
35
  
2.2 Methodology 
I was fortunate enough to have access to unique records which shed light on environmental 
politics. But how is this material to be ordered, structured and made relevant? This document 
study is an analysis of archival records at an institution key to the development of 
environmental policy in post-war Norway. It is through a historical perspective that I enter 
the Norwegian Ministry of Finance. However, designing a research project with the ambition 
of presenting a more complete description of environmental politics is too broad: narrowing 
down the research to explore policy practices seems more appropriate. There are 
environmental taxes that were once expected to be a part of the solution to environmental 
challenges, but which, viewed in retrospect, did not become a part of the solution either 
nationally or internationally. The latent controversy is the process I want to reveal. To open 
the black box of political processes may help understand how new realities are created.  
2.2.1 Research design. 
This is a qualitative research project. The design of the research is supposed to ensure that 
the empirical data answer the research question. At first, the research is more “open” initially 
and more specific units of analysis appear in the material when exploring it: patterns appear. 
As this is a historical study, the actors, actions and issues need to be traced over time to be 
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interpreted by the analyst.
36
 An explanatory design is applied using the interpretation of 
historical material as a method of understanding. New events will not be added to the area of 
research, but through research and working with the material, new understandings may 
emerge.  
2.2.2 Operationalization 
Transcribing all the archival material would not seem particularly fruitful. Nevertheless, 
there is a high degree of detail in the analysis and the space to this is deliberately used. The 
reason for this is the complexity in the material. The narrative is a chronological exposition. 
This study is an empirical study of politics in practice. Reading primary sources directly and 
thoroughly, and developing my own interpretation of the process. In reading through, 
interpreting and retelling the stories that appear in the material, there are several 
characteristics of documentary and textual analysis to be aware of.
37
 I argue this is a process 
of closure, and by studying the process closely, the material becomes easier to grasp. The 
transition in environmental politics from a focus on national financial instruments to the 
establishment of an international level, making the issue governable, opens up and becomes 
possible to see.  
Archival documents are chosen to be archived due to administrative factors or social 
conditions, meaning someone wanted the document to be kept. Documents are always 
written in a context, directed to an audience, so a historical document cannot be read without 
knowing its historical context. These are circumstances that the investigator has to keep in 
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mind, but at the same time texts and documents are rich in data possessing great potential.
38
 
Using a set of a few selected cases, I build the analysis chronologically to follow the ways in 
which the issues develop. At the same time, the cases build on one another and draw together 
information to form a fuller picture. The analysis is undertaken in chapter 3 by virtue of the 
issues and cases chosen, and in chapter 4 the threads and loose ends are tied together to form 
a conclusion. The thesis has been organized thus due to the complexity of the material and to 
ease the accessibility of the material for the reader (as well as the author). 
2.2.3 Collecting data 
The thorough archival search that has been carried out has resulted in rich material. At the 
same time it has a size that demands time and space to justify the broadness in the material; 
space to understand and find patterns on how issues come into being environmental politics. 
The stories in this study are a few of the many stories that were found in the data material. A 
reflected and thorough selection was made in order to illustrate the characteristics of the 
period of study. I have gone through material that sheds light on the matter, especially from 
in the archives of the Budget Department, the Planning Department and the Department of 
indirect taxation and customs at the Ministry of Finance.  
2.2.4 Other sources and literature 
The documentation contains several types of sources such as news clippings, other social 
scientific studies, the database A-text, reports and biographical material. Previous research 
has been conducted by social scientists such as Einar Lie, Kristin Asdal, Yngve Nilsen and 
Marit Reitan. Lie shows how social-economists became shaped by the institution they 
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entered during the initial decades after World War II, but at the same time they themselves 
shaped the ministry‟s role through social-economic aspects and approaches.39 While Lie 
ends his scope of analysis in 1965, Kristin Asdal sheds light on the period between Lie and 
this analytical study by investigating the 1970s and early 1980s.
40
 Yngve Nilsen‟s doctoral 
thesis on expert knowledge and politics within Norwegian CO2 policy during the late 
eighties and nineties is a historical study I also draw on.
41
 In her doctoral thesis published in 
1998 in political science, Marit Reitan has analyzed CO2 taxation in relation to industry in 
the period 1989-96.
42
 She writes that CO2 taxation is one of the most controversial 
instruments ever introduced in Norwegian environmental politics. Her main sources are 
white papers, public documents and interviews with industrial actors and representatives of 
the research-institute sector and the Ministry of the Environment. Her findings in relation to 
the use of CO2 taxation and the principle of cost-effectiveness show that such taxation has 
not been developed cost-efficiently, but rather adapted to the shifting trends in the economy 
and employment situation. Gro Harlem Brundtland`s autobiography is, though biased, a 
biographical source of the events occurring during her period as Minister of the 
Environment and later Prime Minister of Norway. There is also a host of official documents 
regarding the introduction of CO2 taxation and the stabilization of CO2 emissions in 
Norway. The documents I refer to include the white paper St.mld. nr. 46 (1988-89), reports 
from the SIMEN project, the KLØKT project and the official Norwegian report, NOU 
1992:3. I will introduce these basic documents more thoroughly during the analysis. The 
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advantage of political history is the amount of and access to various documentation which 
can be gleaned; the archives provide broad and rich material in addition to what is already 
known. This thesis is unique in the way it uses archival documents at the Ministry of 
Finance as its basis for analyzing the period 1989-1992. This material has not been made 
use of in earlier works in the field.  
2.3 The trouble with nature 
Politics is about change. The national goal of stabilizing CO2-emissions can be looked upon 
as a way of making the national emissions of CO2 governable. This entity of nature was 
quantified as a numeric goal; the maximum release of CO2-emissions in the year 2000 
should be equal to the quantity of emissions released in 1989: it was made measurable. 
When the international negotiations towards an international climate agreement were closing 
in, the Norwegian proposal consisted of a system of trading CO2-quotas. Again, nature was 
made measurable, but this time globally. With the employment of which knowledge or 
technology would this be possible? This thesis is part of a long tradition within Science and 
Technology Studies which studies the dimensions of nature and culture, nature and society.
43
 
In environmental policy, I find it paradoxical that it is with financial reasoning that the 
environment was measured and given priority. Another level is by way of accounting; CO2 
becomes quantifiable, negotiable and tradable in a system of CO2 quotas. By giving “nature” 
financial calculations in a cost-efficient view, nature is translated into a palpable quantity. 
Cronon introduces an ethics of Middle Ground. In this way he overcomes the dimension of 
nature and culture by proposing a use/non-use politics: only then can we “...get on with the 
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unending task of struggling to live rightly in the world – not just in the garden, not just in the 
wilderness, but in the home that encompasses them both”.44 The trouble with nature, as the 
subtitle of this section is called is literally a point of entry to be able to say something, - 
anything, about society, science and politics. Nature is not the starting point, but rather the 
endpoint; “...an effect of various technical and scientific interventions”.45 If this is so, then 
science and technology are no longer linked to power and control in politics (read: 
technocracy), but rather creative forces linked to the formation of objects, issues and work 
practices.
46
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3. Analysis  
 The analytical presentation in this section is ordered chronologically. The structure of the 
analysis reflects two characteristic features that distinguished environmental politics in the 
period 1989-1992; throughout the period, a concern for national environmental policies and 
the nation‟s best interests predominates politically speaking. In the first part of the period, 
commencing in 1989, engagement in environmental politics is salient. The focus is national 
and the financial instruments are used in a national context. The analysis starts with a small, 
though important, investigation conducted by a special working group within the Ministry of 
Finance. The group‟s work is reflected in the Long-Term Programme, which emerged later, 
and the Environmental Tax Committee.
47
 This small-scale, internal investigation reveals 
internal differences regarding economic reasoning and a focus on national and international 
environmental politics. The Environmental Tax Committee functioned during the period of 
time covered by the scope of this thesis. The Committee‟s work took place in two phases: 
the first is its specific work to provide input for the 1991 budget on specific financial 
instruments; in the second phase, the Committee‟s work shifts, its membership changes and 
it incorporates international considerations into its work to provide a foundation for decision-
making within environmental politics in the 1990s. There was an uncertain situation in 
environmental politics from 1989 to mid-1991. The Long-Term Programme for 1990-1993 
shows conflicting goals concerning economic and environmental politics. These conflicting 
goals are viewed as challenges that need a solution, a different policy. The solution to this 
became the production and establishment of a new level: the international level within the 
national. This process forms the second part of this analysis and I shall return to this later in 
                                              
47
 The Environmental Tax Committee in known in Norwegian as “Miljøavgiftsutvalget”, see NOU 
1992:3 for further reading.  
22 
 
the analysis. Throughout the analysis, quotes from the original archived documents are often 
employed. I have translated these as best I can: nevertheless, I would urge the Norwegian 
reader to view the original quotes in the appendix.  
3.1 Part I: promising instruments, from dawn to dusk  
Environmental taxes are not a new financial instrument in Norwegian environmental politics. 
Early in the 1970s, the Ministry of Finance started to involve itself in environmental politics. 
The ministry attempted to solve environmental challenges by quantifying them; by 
translating environmental challenges into market values.
48
 Moreover, the costs of pollution 
would have to be paid by the polluter. At the beginning of the 1970s, the ministry attempted 
to develop environmental principles. The polluter-pays-principle (PPP) was supported 
internationally; indeed, the OECD decided on this principle in spring 1972. Within the 
ministry, three principles within environmental policy were established as foundations for 
further efforts: the polluter-pays-principle (PPP), the principle of using environmental taxes 
and the principle of cost efficiency.
49
 Economists who joined the ministry changed the public 
administration of recourses. In addition, these economists became influenced by the 
institution at which they were employed. As this thesis will demonstrate economists and the 
Ministry of Finance played a salient role in developing environmental politics at the end of 
the 1980s/beginning of the 1990s. The use of financial instruments was given renewed 
attention after the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) published 
its report, Our Common Future, in 1987.  
                                              
48
 Asdal 1998 pp. 13-14. 
49
 Reitan 1998 p. 110 refers to Asdal 1994 p. 67. Asdal‟s book, Knappe ressurser. Økonomenes grep 
om miljøfeltet, builds on her thesis from 1994.  
23 
 
From May 1988 to March 1989, Statistics Norway (SSB) carried out a thorough 
investigation to shed light on environmental political goals while sustaining economic 
growth. The investigation, known as the SIMEN project, directly followed up the World 
Commission‟s report.50 The aim was to ”…evaluate the possibilities for industrial growth 
towards the year 2000, under different restrictions on pollution and different assumptions on 
domestic energy supply”.51 More specifically, with the aim of stabilizing Norwegian CO2 
emissions the report discussed and suggested a substantial increase in the indirect taxation of 
petroleum products for heating and transportation compensated by a reduction in direct taxes 
on wage income. It is this principle, a shift in taxation from tax on income to tax on polluting 
products that would later come to be known as “green taxes”.52 A change in the tax and 
levies system, aiming to force consumer behaviour in benefit of the use of electricity, would 
lead to reductions in emissions and this could be performed by way of taxes – environmental 
taxes. The SIMEN report emphasized a CO2 tax on all fossil fuels that were a source of CO2 
emissions. The SIMEN report also stated it would be possible to stabilize CO2 at 1987 levels 
by the year 2000.
53
 With this ambitious point of departure, CO2 taxation on fossil fuels 
would help stabilize Norway‟s CO2 emissions within the year 2000. Viewed in retrospect, 
however, there was no radical change in the system of taxes and levies in the initial years of 
the 1990s. 
In autumn 1988, during the budget debate, the Storting asked the Government to draw up an 
overview and plan showing how environmental taxes could be incorporated into the overall 
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environmental work.
54
 This request was the direct cause of the establishment of the 
Environmental Tax Committee one year later, in December 1989.
55
 Accordingly, this was 
also the background for the establishment of an internal working group at the Ministry of 
Finance. I will return to this group below. In 1989, environmental politics was national and 
the focus was on financial instruments. Politically, the environment was a hot issue. During 
the first half of 1989, several parallel projects in Norway focused on environmental policies 
in a national context. The SIMEN report, the Government‟s Long-Term Programme and the 
white paper concerning Norway‟s follow-up of the World Commission‟s report all show 
ambitious involvement in environmental politics.
56
 With the aim of stabilizing CO2-
emissions nationally, a radical change in taxes and levies was possible while maintaining 
Norway‟s economic growth.57 
The white paper on Norway‟s follow-up of the World Commission was presented in 
March 1989.
58
 The Brundtland Government confirmed a goal to stabilize CO2-emissions by 
the end of the 1990s.
59
 The government did not state a year of reference, but rather wanted to 
stabilize emissions by 2000. The opposition parties in the Storting criticized the government 
for not being ambitious enough with reference to the recommendations in the World 
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Commission‟s report.60 In the summer of 1989, a broad political movement to reduce 
emissions of CO2 set a goal of stabilizing CO2-emissions. The Storting agreed on a national 
goal to stabilize CO2-emissions to their level in 1989 by the year 2000.
61
 There was no cost-
benefit analysis prior to setting the goal. Nor was it discussed that CO2 does not harm the 
local, Norwegian environment, but rather contributes to global warming.  
The parliamentary election in 1989 was called “the environmental election”.62 In the 
Syse Government‟s inaugural declaration, the new Government said: ”...it will be especially 
important to contribute to an early start in the reductions of carbon dioxide”.63 The 
Government followed the previous government‟s budget: in other words, the proposal 
concerning two environmental taxes was maintained, as was an increase in taxes on mineral 
oil and a tax on diesel. The centre-left Government, that had wanted a more ambitious goal 
while debating stabilization in opposition just six months ago, introduced no further taxes to 
reduce emissions even when in power. The Storting agreed upon the budget and the two 
environmental taxes came into force on 01.01.1990. 
The factors mentioned above establish the foundation and point of departure for 
national environmental politics in this thesis. In the following, I shall turn to specific cases, 
commencing with the small internal investigation into the increased use of environmental 
taxes at the Ministry of Finance. 
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3.1.1 The promising task of investigating the increased use of 
environmental taxes 
At a meeting of the Planning Committee (UPL) at the Ministry of Finance, immediately after 
the budget debate during which the Storting had requested an overview and plan showing 
how to incorporate environmental taxes into the overall environmental work, the State 
Secretary said that, within the Ministry of Finance, an investigation must be initiated 
“aiming to shed light on and to what degree it is technically and professionally acceptable to 
use environmental taxes”.64 The Working Group was to provide input concerning the 
increased use of environmental taxes in the ongoing work on the Long-Term Programme for 
1990-1993 in a chapter called “Sustainable Development”. It was the Planning Department 
that responded to State Secretary Bjørn Skogstad Aamo`s inquiry.  
After consultation with the other departments within the ministry, the Planning 
Department outlined four issues that seemed to need exploring.
65
 In general, the four issues 
pertained to a restructuring of the taxation system within environmental policy, and the 
frame was national. First of all, with sustainable development as a premise, which products 
and input factors that were expected to be challenging would be investigated. Secondly, the 
Working Group should explore within which of these challenging areas, from a technical and 
professional point of view, increased taxes could be introduced. Thirdly, an assessment of 
the impact of different initiatives, especially the effects on the environment and revenue on 
                                              
64
 AT, arkivboks 574.00 1986-1989, arkivmappe 3519, brev fra PA til stsekr OP 2.12.88. Bjørn 
Skogstad Aamo was State Secretary at the Ministry of Finance from 1973 to 1979. UPL (Utvalg for 
Planlegging) does not have an English translation; I have used Planning Committee to indicate its 
function. 
65
 AT, arkivboks 574.00 1986-1989, arkivmappe 3519, brev fra PA til stsekr OP 2.12.88. 
27 
 
taxes, and the costs of adopting these for industry and consumers, was requested.
66
 Finally, a 
short qualitative discussion should be provided of the scale of the different initiatives if the 
taxation system were to be restructured.
67
 The four issues outlined above do neither deal 
with the possibility for an international climate agreement, nor the consequences of such an 
agreement.
68
 Moreover, at this point it was obvious that a solution to the environmental 
challenges lay in a restructuring of the taxation system. The ministry approached national 
environmental challenges framed within a national context.  
Three of the issues outlined by the Working Group were later maintained in the 
mandate of the Environmental Tax Committee.
69
 Nevertheless, the words chosen to 
underline the possible effects of an increase in the use of financial instruments in 
environmental politics were, to a certain degree, harsher in the mandate of the Committee. 
The challenges and the meaning of the mandate were the same in both initiatives. One 
rhetorical example appears when the Working Group looked into “problematic products and 
input factors” (Norwegian: “...innsatsfaktorer og produkter som kan være problematiske…”), 
while the Committee looks into the “harmful effects of products and production processes” 
(Norwegian: “...varer og produksjonsprosesser som har skadevirkninger...”). While the 
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Committee looks into economic effects, especially “effects on competition and distribution” 
(Norwegian: “...konkurranseeffekter og fordelingsvirkninger”), the Working Group looks 
into “re-structuring costs for industry and consumers” (Norwegian: “...omstillingskostnader 
for næringer og konsumenter”).70 This last example shows that there was an expectation that 
the taxation system would be re-structured due to the use of the term re-structuring costs. 
The Committee investigated the effects of a potential change in taxes. Both these initiatives 
show that the focus in terms of developing practical economic policy was on a restructuring 
and change in the taxation system wholly within a national context. The two initiatives, that 
of the Working Group and the Committee, were interlinked, and originated from the same 
budget debate in autumn 1988, and a more or less identical problematization of the field 
emerged.  
The Working Group at the Ministry of Finance was established in December 1988 
and operated for a short period of time.
71
 Its members were from the Ministry of Finance and 
consisted of the Department of indirect taxation and customs, the Planning Department and 
the Tax Policy Section.
72
 In the following I will look into the work performed internally and 
the differing approaches to the task, especially by the Department of indirect taxation and 
customs and the Planning Department. 
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3.1.2 A proposal from a lukewarm department  
The Working Group submitted its report to State Secretary Aamo on 3 January 1989.
73
 
Although it was a joint report, different positions in the Planning Department and the 
Department of indirect taxation and customs respectively emerge. In the Working Group, the 
Department of indirect taxation and customs was in general positive to environmental 
taxation as an instrument; they use pollution as an example of a negative externality where 
taxes may be a sufficient instrument.
74
 The department stressed the importance of clarifying 
what the purpose of the change in the taxation system might be. An increase in 
environmental taxes could either imply an increase or a neutral effect on tax revenue, 
depending on the purpose of the taxation; either the purpose would have a neutral effect, and 
other taxes would be reduced to counteract the increase, or the purpose would be an increase 
in state income from revenue on taxes and this increase would be introduced without other 
adjustments in the taxation system.
75
    
The Department of indirect taxation and customs seemed eager to emphasize the 
potential negative effects of the increased use of environmental taxes. In a passage marked 
with pencil in the margin, the department warned against diminished economic growth in 
Norway; “…high taxes introduced because of the environment, and which at the same time 
have an effect on several branches of industry, will have repercussions such as reduced 
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economic growth in general as a result of low economic activity in society, price increases 
and a diminished ability to compete in international markets”.76 
 Between 1987 and 1989, the unemployment rate in Norway doubled within twelve 
months: indeed, concerns about this rising unemployment were on the political agenda for 
several years in the late 1980s/early 1990s.
77
 The Department of indirect taxation and 
customs indicated one area within which environmental taxes would contribute to a 
reduction in the consumption of fossil fuels. The department stated: “...taxes as an 
instrument to manage energy consumption seem to be most effective in the case of 
households”.78 Just this one was suggested by the Department of indirect taxation and 
customs. Price elasticity was higher for heating oil.
79
 Due to high price elasticity, an 
introduction of environmental taxes was assumed to have fewer negative effects than in the 
case of low price elasticity. 38% of Norwegian households used, at the time, oil for heating, 
while 9% used coal, coke and wood. Consumption of energy by industry took the form of 
22% oil and 23% from coal, coke and wood. Industry, whose energy sources stemmed less 
from oil, would be shielded from the tax. Reitan mentions a mobilization in industrial 
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organizations affects the degree of environmental taxes in domestic power intensive 
industry.
80
  
3.1.3 An attempt to explore new (political) ideas 
The Planning Department took another approach in the Working Group, emphasizing future 
international climate agreements. Nevertheless, the department arrives at the same 
conclusion as the Department of indirect taxation and customs in suggesting environmental 
taxation on heating oil to reduce combustion of fossil fuels.  
The Planning Department stand out as the only department in the Working Group that 
realizes the need for a reflection and a position in international environmental politics. The 
department mentions that the possibility for an international agreement on CO2 emissions or 
energy consumption was being discussed at the time in international forums such as 
UNEP.
81 
These discussions were unclear whether the aim of an international climate 
agreement would be to reduce CO2 emissions or to reduce energy consumption. But whose 
position and attitude was it that was communicated? Was there an awareness among civil 
servants or politicians about the significance and consequences an international climate 
agreement might have for Norwegian interests? Thoughts were certainly dawning about this 
in the Planning Department.
82
 
The department  encouraged the effects of elements in an international agreement to 
be considered specifically, saying: ”The exact wording of an international agreement on CO2 
                                              
80
 Reitan 1998 pp. 163-170. 
81
 AT, arkivboks 574.00 1986-1989, arkivmappe 3519, notat 13.12.1988.  The Planning Department 
was later represented in  the Environmental Tax Committee, the Interministeral Climate Group and 
the “idegruppe for internasjonale klimaavtaler”. 
82
 AT, arkivboks 574.00 1986-1989, arkivmappe 3519, notat 13.12.1988. 
32 
 
or energy consumption may be of great importance…”.83 In other international 
environmental agreements that Norway was party to, the form of the agreement consisted of 
equal percentage reductions in all countries party to the agreement. This concerns the NOX, 
SO2 and Montreal agreements. The Department  expressed another type of agreement than 
equal percentage reductions as a possibility for future agreements: ”... a CO2 agreement that 
can be bound to emissions per capita would benefit Norway, rather than equal percentage 
reductions in all countries”.84 Was this just the Planning Department expressing its ideas or 
were other actors also aware of a desired position for Norway? What we do know is that 
Norway later did not want equal percentage reductions in all countries, or an international 
climate agreement bound to emissions per capita. It seems as if there was no clear 
understanding at this point in time of differences in the nature of the emissions; NOX-
emissions create local pollution, while CO2-emissions create global pollution in the form of 
global warming, independent of the location of CO2-emissions. 
It was mentioned that Norway needed more energy than most OECD countries for 
heating. This argument was repeated in the early phase of the climate debate, but was 
dropped later. Generally speaking, the claim was  that no matter the form of an international 
CO2-agreement, the agreement would adversely affect Norway‟s competitiveness.
85
 These 
meant that the Planning Department at the Ministry of Finance at this point in time were 
reflecting on the exact position they believed Norway should take towards an international 
environmental agreement and a CO2-agreement. In 1988, and later in the climate debate, the 
high use of renewable energy in Norway‟s power supply was used as an argument explaining 
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Norway`s difficulty in swapping from fossil fuels in power production to renewables. On 
this basis, Nicolaisen claimed that other countries, with a higher degree of reliance on fossil 
fuels in their power supply, could more easily reduce their CO2-emissions by swapping over 
from coal to gas as the energy source in power production.
86
 Later in climate politics, this 
argument, termed “gassargumentet”, becomes salient due to Norway‟s natural gas deposits 
and gas exports to other European countries. 
Concerning environmental taxation, the Department  specifically suggests taxation on 
oil for household heating.As it was stated: ”Heating households with oil can relatively easily 
be replaced with electricity”; and: ”...emissions stemming from transportation can be 
difficult to influence due to high income elasticity and low price elasticity”.87 Again, 
household heating is proposed as an area suitable for introducing environmental taxes while 
industry, here the transport sector, is shielded due to considerations of price elasticity. The 
two departments agree on the use of taxes on oil for heating in households. But the Planning 
Department is more explicit in its consideration of a future international climate agreement 
and expresses explicit thoughts concerning how an international agreement could be 
designed. 
The final report of the Working Group showed that the group regarded its mission as 
being a purely technical taxation matter to increase environmental taxes in Norway to reduce 
emissions nationally. This is in line with assessments in the Long-Term Programme of 1990-
1993: the focus is on national efforts, and the Government states: ”...it is only by a change in 
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politics in each country that sustainable development can be achieved. One must think 
globally, while acting locally”.88 Accordingly, there was an inconsistency in the emphasis 
Nicolaisen of the Planning Department placed on a possible international CO2 or energy-
consumption agreement, and what the Department of indirect taxation and customs and the 
final report emphasized. Very little of the Planning Department‟s position is visible in the 
final report; it seems as though the views of the Department of indirect taxation and customs 
predominated within the Working Group. The consequences of an international climate 
agreement involving CO2-reductions or energy reduction were not taken into consideration. 
The group focused on possible changes in the taxation system for fossil fuels. Nevertheless, 
CO2-emissions were not mentioned in the conclusion of the Working Group to the State 
Secretary. 
Three specific environmental taxes to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels were 
suggested by the Working Group: a tax on petrol, a new tax on diesel (at the time, there was 
a tax on the amount on kilometres driven), and an extension of the tax on mineral oil. 
Several of the claims the Department of indirect taxation and customs put forward were 
reflected in the report. In addition to the three environmental taxes suggested, the Working 
Group arrived at three measures. First, they recommended an increase in taxes to guide 
households‟ heating sources towards electricity. In relation to the Long-Term Programme,  
SSB, suggested the same proposals as did the internal working group; a shift in the sources 
of energy for household heating and an increase in the taxation of mineral oil used for 
transportation to achieve a stabilization of CO2-emissions by the year 2000.  SSB 
commented that an increase in the price of heating oil to make industry and households use 
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electricity for heating could be an instrument that contributed to achieving a stabilization of 
CO2 emissions. It is interesting that SSB mentions both industry and households in their 
comment since other suggestions pertain only to households.
89
 SSB also believed an increase 
in the taxation of transportation oils could slow the growth of motorized traffic to reduce 
CO2 emissions. 
The second recommendation was the need to clarify whether an increase in taxation 
should lead to an increase in state tax revenue or whether such taxation was supposed to 
have a neutral effect on state income. Thirdly, the Working Group warned against the 
possibility that ”...taxes that deliberately or unintendedly affect trade may cause reactions 
and protests from our trading partners”.90 In this regard, the EU`s internal market was 
mentioned. The Working Group concludes its report thus: “It is difficult to see that the tax 
changes at hand will not lead to a higher price on diesel. This will be particularly noticeable 
in the transport sector and in transportation-intensive, competition-sensitive industry in rural 
areas, for example in fish farming and in the furniture industry. In a case of distortion of 
competition between Norway and other countries, this will considerably affect the ability to 
compete in international markets”.91 Moreover, it was only within the area of households 
which used oil for heating that the Working Group wholeheartedly recommended 
environmental taxes. In general, the group was positive to the use of environmental taxes 
based on economic theoretical reasoning. Nevertheless, specific suggestions were scarce. In 
the Government‟s Long-Term Programme, it is possible to find some explanation for why 
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environmental taxes were not broadly introduced despite the optimistic ambitions in SIMEN. 
Even though the Programme supported environmental taxes, conflicting goals in 
environmental and economic politics also became evident. 
3.2 Conflicting goals and underlying controversy 
In the Planning Department‟s archives at the Ministry of Finance, there is an amount of 
documents including comments on the development of the Long-Term Programme for 1990-
1993. The comments touch on potentially conflicting goals between environmental and 
economic policy. At this point in time, the white paper on Norway‟s follow-up of the World 
Commission had not yet been published and the Government had yet to officially formulate 
a goal to stabilize CO2-emissions.  
In the Long-Term Programme, the Government signalized the use of taxes – 
environmental taxes – in national environmental politics.92 The Government stated that it 
would ”...continue to pursue a price and taxation policy that provides for the environmental 
costs to be reflected in energy prices”.93 The Working Group recommended a gradual 
restructuring of tax policy in several years‟ time to avoid “consequences that are difficult to 
follow up” in the Governments Long-Term Programme.94 As to the rate of restructuring, the 
Government commented in the Programme; ”With a quick introduction of tighter 
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environmental requirements, the achievement of economic growth and a sufficient 
development in the rate of employment will become a more demanding task”.95 The mandate 
of the Working Group was to provide input for the Long-Term Programme. This input was 
perhaps most visible in this reserved attitude that was expressed in relation to specific 
changes in taxation and in the emphasis placed on the possible repercussions of restructuring 
the taxation system. 
Regarding the prices presupposed by the Programme, the Planning Department 
commented: ”...in the economic draft in the Long-Term Programme substantial changes are 
not presupposed in the prices of different sources of energy”.96 This was the direct opposite 
of what the Government had stated; environmental costs were to be reflected in energy 
prices. Also Norges Bank commented on the preconditions of the Programme to the Minister 
of Finance, Gunnar Berge: ”...there is a serious inconsistency in the fact that if one succeed 
in an international agreement on the consumption of fossil fuels it will affect the demand for 
oil and the path of price movements that is currently drafted. With such a restriction on 
production, we will not be able to increase our production of oil as it is assumed. A 
successful global disposal of resources will radically change the assumptions of the 
programme in the petroleum sector“.97 In the actual Programme, “Sustainable Development” 
was the second chapter. In his comment, the Central Bank believed it was correct to put the 
chapter in such a prominent place in the Programme.
98
 The Planning Department‟s attention 
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to the presupposed energy prices and the Government‟s emphasis of “sustainable 
development” in the Programme illustrate the conflicting goals. Nevertheless, this shows a 
desire to integrate environmental politics into the economic politics in the way the World 
Commission recommended.
99
 One might say there was a realization of a clash of interests. 
Even though the conflicting goals were acknowledged, the situation did not develop into 
open controversy.  
Several leaders of societal institutions and others associated with the Ministry of 
Finance commented on the conflicting goals in the Long-Term Programme. The Norwegian 
Ambassador to the OECD at the time and commented from his office in Paris.
100
 He says: 
”Should...,... the conflicting goals that are obvious be additionally discussed? Should one be 
more careful in light of the optimistic presumptions that are made and the unsure situation in 
economic development?”.101 In relation to this, it was pointed out that that success in 
achieving increased competitiveness and low unemployment was a premise to succeed in the 
other priorities, implicitly the environment.
 102
 Environmental taxes was not specifically 
mentioned. It is hard to interpret this as anything but that it was believed that any additional 
burden on industry and households should wait due to reduced competitive power and a 
reduction of buying power. The Ministry of Transport and Communications commented on 
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the conflicting goals in the following manner: ”A preliminary assessment of the 
macroeconomic extrapolation (fremskrivning; my comment) of the development in the 
consumption of energy from fossil fuels shows a severe inconsistency between industrial 
development in the macroeconomic calculations and the goals in environmental politics. A 
great deal depends on the exact formulation of a goal for the development of use of 
energy/fossil fuels”.103  
The comments on the Long-Term Programme made by the Ambassador to the OECD, 
the Central Bank and the comment by the Ministry of Transport and Communications 
pictures a draft where the conflicting goals between environmental and economic goals are 
salient. In addition, the presumptions regarding the development of energy prices were 
conflicting; the Government expresses a general thought involving environmental costs 
being reflected in energy prices, but at the Ministry of Finance, such assumptions were not 
taken into consideration in the calculations according to the Planning Department.  
This underlying controversy characterizes environmental policy at this point in time. It 
was the Ministry of Finance that was supposed to handle both the national finances and 
develop a proper environmental taxation system. These conflicting goals illustrate the 
unsettled situation that Norwegian environmental politics found itself in at the time and that 
surfaced in the comments pertaining to the Long-Term Programme 1990-1993. Head of 
Research, SSB, Svein Longva summed up his comments on the Long-Term Programme and 
ends laconically: ”Environmental politics is a tricky issue...Is the printing of the R-draft 
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(Governmental draft; my comment) on alternately bleached and unbleached paper an 
expression for the tottering in environmental politics?”.104  
3.2.1 The beginning of an end (for environmental taxes) 
In the work performed in relation to the Long-Term Programme, it becomes clear that in 
some sections of the Ministry of Finance there was an awareness that Norway should be 
conscious of its position vis-à-vis the possible development of an international CO2 or 
energy-consumption agreement. The Planning Department stated this in its work with the 
internal Working Group. This view was not reflected in the report that was sent to the State 
Secretary as input to the Long-Term Programme. The comments on an international climate 
agreement were not considered in the economic politics of the time. One may say that the 
international aspect would not obstruct the Government‟s ambition to increase the use of 
environmental taxes. However, conflicting goals between environmental goals and economic 
goals in the Long-Term Programme show that the use of environmental taxes is part of the 
overall economic politics. It was macroeconomic considerations concerning competitiveness 
in Norway and internationally, employment, regional policy and politics of distribution that 
were to be considered and prioritized combined with environmental goals. Due to the 
economic theoretical practices that were used when prioritizing, the financial instruments did 
not become the solution in practical politics.  
As earlier mentioned an increase in the tax on mineral oil and a change in the tax on 
diesel from taxation on kilometres were the two environmental taxes introduced from 
01.01.1990. In the comments on the Programme from the Planning Department, the Central 
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Bank Governor, SSB`s Longva and the Ministry of Transport and Communications it was 
noted that there was uncertainty regarding how an international climate agreement might 
affect the Norwegian economy. In this way, at the turn of 1988/89, the expectancy that an 
international climate agreement might be drawn up marked the input to practical 
environmental politics. However, Norway‟s expectations would change in 1989. It is 
obvious that there was uncertainty regarding whether the international agreement would 
pertain to reductions in energy consumption or CO2-emissions, much like Jon Nicolaisen had 
mentioned in his input to the Working Group at the Ministry of Finance. The work on the 
Long-Term Programme and the Programme itself illustrate the open situation of 
environmental politics at the time. There was still no clear solution to tackle conflicting 
goals.  
3.3 A fading goal in environmental politics 
During the debating of the national budget in the Storting in autumn 1988, the Storting asked 
the Government to draw up a summary and a plan regarding the way in which environmental 
taxes could be used in environmental politics.
105
 This request was to lead to the appointment 
of the Environmental Tax Committee one year later, in December 1989.
106
 While the 
Working Group that was founded pursuant to this request gave input on the Long-Term 
Programme presented in 1989, and whose work was reflected in taxation proposals for the 
budget for 1990, the Environmental Tax Committee was to provide input for the next 
budget, that of 1991. As mentioned earlier, the work of the Committee took place in two 
phases. This thesis views the committees work as separated in two phases, other social 
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scientific research in the field has not taken that approach, nor investigated the committees 
work so closely. The first phase is, according to its mandate to provide a basis for decision-
making in environmental politics in relation to the use of financial instruments in the 1991 
budget.
107
 In the second phase, the Committee‟s work illustrates the unclarified situation in 
environmental politics. This is the premature production of a new level in environmental 
politics, a solution to the underlying controversy. The Committee‟s leader gave a speech in 
this period which demonstrates the unclarified nature of the situation, and he may be 
interpreted as having split interests in terms of the national financial instruments and the 
stance on international climate politics. I will return to this in Part II of the analysis by 
focusing on the specific creation of an international level within the national one. 
 Financial Advisor Thorvald Moe, representing the Ministry of Finance, was 
appointed chair of the committee. The Environmental Tax Committee consisted originally of 
eight members and five secretaries. These were four representatives from the Ministry of 
Finance, and one representative from the following ministries and institutions: the Ministry 
of the Environment; the Ministry of Transport and Communications; SSB; and the 
Department of Economics at the University of Oslo. Of the five secretaries, three represent 
the Ministry of Finance and two the Ministry of the Environment.
108
 The Environmental Tax 
Committee was broader and more comprehensive that the Working Group one year earlier. 
Nevertheless, the Committee‟s members come from just a few ministries, and all were 
economists – so its composition was perhaps not so broad after all.  
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In its final report submitted in February 1992, the Environmental Tax Committee 
advised the government to have a flexible attitude towards the point in time when the 
national stabilization of CO2 should be put into effect.
109
 Moreover, this means that the goal 
of stabilization from 1989 had been dropped. I will not further outline the difference 
internally in the Environmental Tax Committee; others have outlined this in previous 
works.
110
 In the following i return to the first and second phase of the Environmental Tax 
Committee‟s work.  
3.3.1 First phase 
In its first report, the Committee proposed several environmental taxes, all in accordance 
with economic theories of negative externalities. One scholar of economics recognized at the 
Ministry of Finance in environmental issues
 
is the British economist, Arthur Cecil Pigou 
(1877-1959).
111
 At this point, the Government possessed an explicit strategy to reduce CO2-
emissions, due to the decision made by the Storting in autumn 1989. A month before the 
report, in early April 1990, the Budget Department considered the Committee‟s input on the 
budget. The comments pertained to the overall strategy as well as the more specific 
suggestions. The Budget Department agreed with the Committee in its main strategy; 
taxation of fossil fuels. Regarding this matter, the department said: ”The use of taxation in 
order to reduce the increase in consumption is to be viewed as cost-efficient”.112 At the 
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ministry, the term “cost-effective” was used in connection with the proposed taxes. “Cost-
effective” was often used as part of the ministry‟s reasoning.  
Concerning the proposed taxes, the department was less enthusiastic, as their 
comments show: ”whether the different proposals represent a cost-efficient use of 
instruments is…highly unclear”.113 This comment was sent to the Financial Advisor and 
chair of the Committee, Thorvald Moe. Furthermore, the department commented on three 
specific suggestions; 1) a system for deposit or return of waste oil, 2) a fee on control of fish 
farming, and 3) to increase tax on fertilizers. First, the department commented on the 
proposition on a system for deposit or return of waste oil: ”The Budget Department strongly 
advises against an introduction of a system for a deposit/return of waste oil”.114 The 
background for this strong statement was that collection of waste oil was 78% in 1988. 
According to the department, this was regarded as a high degree of collection. In addition, 
there were negotiations ongoing with industry concerning a future waste disposal plant in 
Mo i Rana. The negotiations pertained to obligations the industry to build and operate a 
special waste plant. In other words, the suggestion was rejected based on the ongoing 
negotiations with industry, and due to the department`s understanding of a high degree of 
collection.
115
 It seems the Budget Department believed the high degree of collection would 
not make the suggestion cost-effective. Using resources to collect the remaining 22% of 
waste oil was deemed inappropriate and be a waste of resources. In addition, the ongoing 
negotiations might lead to industry having to bear the costs, not the state. Concerning the 
second proposal, on a fee on control of fish farming, the Budget Department‟s opinion was 
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as follows: ”...this is clearly a budgetary case and should be considered in relation to the 
ordinary discussions of the budget”.116 In other words, the suggestion should be transferred 
to the Ministry of the Environment or be handled internally at the Ministry of Finance. 
 Regarding the third suggestion, an increase in taxes on fertilizers, the Budget 
Department‟s opinion was that this increase should be postponed due to the lack of thorough 
cost-benefit analyses. According to the North Sea Declaration, Norway was obliged to 
reduce emissions of nutrient salts into the North Sea by 50% by 1995. The Budget 
Department said no thorough cost-benefit analysis had been conducted showing how 
Norway, in a cost-effective way, could meet this obligation. On these grounds, the 
department could not determine whether a tax on fertilizers was the most cost-efficient 
instrument.
117
 My point is that the proposal for a tax on fertilizers aimed to help Norway 
fulfil an international agreement it was party to: the North Sea Declaration. Nevertheless, the 
Budget Department did not want to implement initiatives until they were certain that the 
instruments in use were cost-effective. Meanwhile, time is passing and additional nutrient 
salts and fertilizers continue to flow into the North Sea. The Budget Department 
recommended that the proposal be transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture for further 
investigation.  
In late April, when the Environmental Tax Committee submitted its first report, it 
seems as if the Committee at least in part had chosen to ignore the recommendations of the 
Budget Department. The Committee supported the suggestions concerning a fee on control 
of fish farming and the suggested fertilizer tax. In this second round of comments, the 
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Budget Department sent a memorandum to the Department of indirect taxation and customs. 
The Committee‟s leader, Thorvald Moe, was copied into the letter but later removed with 
Tip-ex.
118
 I am not going to read too much into this, however, due to the fact that the Budget 
Department‟s opinion was already known to Moe. In outspoken language, the Budget 
Department commented, for the second time, on the suggestion concerning fish farming as 
follows: ”the suggested tax at hand on the control of fish farming will have an effect on the 
debit side of the budget. There is currently no such control. The Budget Department would 
suggest that the Ministry of the Environment may look at this during their regular work on 
the budget”.119 In other words, the responsibility was to be transferred from the Committee 
to the Ministry of the Environment on the grounds of balancing the budget. Regarding an 
increase in fertilizer tax, the Budget Department commented on this proposal for the second 
time as well. There are no traces of comments in the letter concerning the ongoing 
negotiations with industry on the lack of cost-efficiency due to the high degree of 
collection.
120
 The department now thought the suggestion should be considered within the 
overall framework of environmental taxes in relation to the budget for 1991. In other words, 
the responsibility had been shifted from the Committee to the sector ministry, the Ministry of 
Agriculture. An additional suggestion was commented on, a proposition for a kind of 
purchasing tax on the costs involved in returning lead accumulators. The Budget Department 
thought such a solution would affect the debit side of the budget, and the department 
presumed this suggestion could be proposed through the ordinary budget process. In other 
words, the suggestion was transferred to the sector ministry; the responsibility was 
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transferred from the Committee to the Ministry of the Environment and the reasoning lay in 
the concern for balancing the budget. 
 The above examples show that the Committee proposed specific suggestions for 
changes in the taxation system. However, in this case the Budget Department fragmented the 
Committee‟s mandate and power by transferring case-by-case suggestions from the 
Committee to the relevant sector ministry. The Budget Department‟s interest was in 
balancing the budget and the cost-efficient use of instruments. The Budget Department 
shows no sign of wishing to cut through the discussion and introduce taxation that could help 
alleviate environmental challenges. The reason for this may lie in the term “cost-efficiency”. 
The Committee and Moe had several suggestions concerning environmental taxes, but the 
Budget Department rejects them. It seems as though it is due to the way in which the 
economists at the Budget Department practised their economic skills that the environmental 
taxes proposed did not gain a foothold.  
According to Reitan, the input to the budget of 1991 consisted of a suggestion to 
introduce Norway‟s first CO2 taxations and this became clear in the Syse Government‟s 
budget for 1991 in the autumn of 1990.
121
 But when the Syse Government presented its 
budget in October 1990, CO2 taxes had been reduced to an extra tax on petrol and mineral 
oil. The SIMEN project had presumed a CO2 tax on all CO2-emissions.  
3.3.2 Second phase 
Later, in the summer of 1990, the composition of the Environmental Tax Committee 
changed. Would the result of the Committee‟s work have been different if the Committee 
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had had the same members throughout the process? Up until autumn 1990, the Committee 
had consisted of eight members. Two of the Committee‟s original members left it in late 
summer 1990, and four new members joined the Committee during the following autumn. 
Now, the Environmental Tax Committee had ten members and six secretaries.122 After the 
change in membership, the Ministry of Finance was no longer so heavily represented. The 
Environmental Tax Committee had in April 1990, according to its mandate, provided input 
concerning the budget process for 1991 and was now entering the second phase of its work 
when the aim was a Norwegian Official Investigation (NOU).
123
 Correspondence shows that 
the Economic Policy Department and the Tax Policy Section withdrew their representatives 
from the Committee. The reasoning for this was that “The investigation will raise 
comprehensive and difficult questions. While the Environmental Tax Committee is supposed 
to have a long-term and principle perspective, it will be difficult to avoid questions that 
relates to the day-to-day economical politics. It can become challenging to handle these in 
the Committee”.124 
 The Economic Policy Department holds a powerful role in the ministry and perhaps 
there are conflicting interests between the department and the Committee. The Economic 
Policy Department and the Tax Policy Section and ”possibly” Department of indirect 
taxation and customs should not be represented on the Committee. Rather, the suggestion 
was to external expertise being drawn into supplement the Committee‟s competence within, 
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for example, technological expertise, expertise on environmental and pollution challenges, 
and industrial economic expertise. Does this mean that the Economic Policy Department and 
the Tax Policy Section think the current skills within the Committee are inadequate to fulfil 
its mandate? The mandate did not ask for technological innovation or climatic assessments, 
moreover the task was to investigate a basis for decision-making in environmental politics 
grounded in economic skills or knowledge of the Norwegian system of taxation.
125
 The 
Economic Policy Department and the Tax Policy Section recommended that it should be 
considered how, in an “appropriate” way, to include a few of the central interest groups due 
to the penetration of the investigation. Is the involvement of interest groups here meant to 
ensure a comprehensive investigation, or is it an alibi due to the “appropriate” involvement. 
To ensure a certain ”distance”, a good proportion of the Committee‟s investigations should 
be outsourced to independent research institutes, according to the Economic Policy 
Department.  
Currently, SSB is often viewed as a “research department” within the Ministry of 
Finance and the KLØKT project was being conducted at the behest of the Interdepartmental 
Climate Group. Did Eggum Johansen and Røyne really want to create a “distance” in 
relation to this work or was this an attempt to avoid handling the conflicting goals of 
environmental and economic politics within the ministry?  
By outsourcing investigations to independent research institutes, others would be 
handling the problematic nature of the mission. Joining the Environmental Tax Committee 
we find Nils Axel Braathen from the Ministry of Industry, Dag Omre from the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy and Olav Igesund from the Norwegian Directorate of Customs and 
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Excise. Olav Igesund replaces Assistant Director General von der Fehr from the Tax Policy 
Section on the Committee.
126
 What kind of step is this? By withdrawing von der Fehr and 
replacing him with Igsund, the Tax Policy Section was creating the “distance” it had asked 
for in relation to the work involved in the daily running of economic politics. At the same 
time, the Customs and Excise Administration is organized under the Ministry of Finance. 
Accordingly, there was no greater threat of the representative of the Customs and Excise 
Administration offering considerably different input and opinions than the earlier 
representative from the Ministry of Finance. As mentioned above, the Ministry of Industry 
and the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy now joined the Committee. Olav Prestmo of the 
Ministry of Transportation and Communications, Jon Nicolaisen and Thorvald Moe of the 
Ministry of Finance were original members of the Committee. Thereby, the Ministry of 
Transportation and Communications, the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy and the Ministry of Finance, in addition to the other members of the Committee, are 
gathered in one investigative group from autumn 1990; the Environmental Tax Committee. 
It is the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, the Ministry of Industry and the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy that represent the highest share of Norwegian CO2 
emissions in their sectors; transportation, power-intensive industry and petroleum 
production. When speaking of Norwegian CO2 emissions the Planning Department referred 
to the SIMEN project .
127
 CO2 emissions in Norway were distributed as follows: 30% from 
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heating, 30% from power-intensive industry and 40% from transportation.
128
 Therefore, the 
Ministry of Transportation and Communications and the Ministry of Industry will carry a 
great deal of the burden in the case of national environmental goals or in the case of an 
international CO2-agreement. In the petroleum sector, the production of oil and gas on the 
Norwegian continental shelf causes a high amount of emissions and, in the later negotiations 
concerning an international climate agreement, this will be key in considering  and 
developing a ”joint implementation”.129  
In the conclusion of the Environmental Tax Committee, the Committee recommends 
that ”...the Government should take a flexible attitude towards the future point in time when 
a national stabilizing occurs”.130 In the white paper concerning Norway‟s follow-up of the 
World Commission, the Government emphasized that the goal of stabilization was for the 
time being and would be re-considered.
131
 In the same way, the Committee emphasized that 
”...the goal (goal of stabilizing CO2 emissions: my comment) will be considered as time goes 
by and in light of other investigations”.132 The scope of environmental goals will influence 
the environmental development.
 133
 Nevertheless, the Ministry of Finance did not take into 
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consideration a strict goal for the environment in the calculations for the Long-Term 
Programme 1990-1993. This was a point Central Bank Governor Skånland made in 
connection with the Programme.
134
 In the first phase of the Environmental Tax Committee‟s 
work, several of the members were members of the Interdepartmental Climate Group as 
well. The focus in this time period was on specific environmental taxes that aimed to reduce 
environmental challenges. This is evident in the specific suggestions of the Committee in its 
report in April 1990. In the second phase of the Committee‟s work, when it became obvious 
that the Committee‟s work was going to result in an NOU, the membership of the 
Committee was changed. In the taxes proposed that was the basis for the budget for 1991 
was also the suggestion on a CO2 tax.  It seems as if the change in membership did not affect 
the work in the sense of leading it in the direction of additional proposals. On the contrary, it 
may be that the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy joining the 
Committee led to a focus on who was to carry the burden of reductions in emissions. 
In the second half of 1990, Thorvald Moe participated in the Norwegian delegation to 
the Climate Convention in Rio de Janeiro. A representative from the Ministry of Finance 
was invited by State Secretary Jens Stoltenberg at the Ministry of the Environment, in 
“forum for international agreements”, from January 1991.135 Several members of the 
Committee were also members of other forums and committees. It is possible that not just 
the work done within the Committee led to the goal to stabilize CO2-emissions nationally 
being dropped. Rather, the sum of the activities that the members of the Committee do and 
                                              
134
 PA 1988-1989, arkivboks nr. 7, arkivmappe 102.30 Langtidsprogrammet 1990-1993 generelt, 
brev fra  Norges Bank til str Fd 29.12.1988 
135
 This forum was called in Norwegian the ”idegruppen for internasjonale avtaler”. Norway‟s current 
Prime Minister, Jens Stoltenberg, was the initiator of this forum, as State Secretary at the Ministry of 
the Environment from 1990-1991. I will in the following use the a translated name; “forum for 
international agreements”  
53 
 
learn in different initiatives may have lead to this conclusion in the final report of the 
Committee. The shift in the Committee‟s engagement in internationally directed initiatives 
might have made it easier to depart from the national goal of stabilization even though this 
probably was evident in the report delivered in April 1990.  
3.4 Brief Account of Part I 
In environmental politics in 1989 the financial instruments was promoted as the solution to 
national environmental challenges. The SIMEN-project promoted a radical change in the 
taxation system in order to reduce CO2 emissions and at the same time maintain economic 
growth.  It was expected that this radical change was to be the solution to national 
environmental challenges. Nevertheless, with the upcoming Rio Conventions the focus in 
international politics turn to climate politics. In the Long–term Programme and through the 
work of the Environmental Tax Committee there is a realization of conflicting goals in 
environmental politics. The growing focus on an upcoming international climate agreement 
and its consequences on Norwegian environmental politics, future oil fortune and economic 
growth were realised. How was Norway to strategically develop environmental politics 
ensuring National interests? The open situation was closing in on one solution. By the 
production of an international level within the national environmental politics, focus changed 
and the motifs in national environmental politics became international. In the following 
section, Part II, the production of this level is outlined.   
3.5 Part II: Production of politics and the formation of 
political issues  
The analytical presentation in this section is also ordered chronologically. Part I and Part II 
take their point of departure in 1989. In this section, the focus is on the production of an 
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international level as a solution to the underlying national controversy over economic growth 
and environmental protection. The focus in environmental politics shifted, and a way to 
solve this controversy was by producing an international level within national environmental 
politics. In this section I will attempt, step by step, to describe this process. Marit Reitan sees 
the level in climate politics as it was the national politics that were moved up to the 
international level.
136
 In this section, I argue and demonstrate that the international level was 
produced within the national level, and that the earlier focus on environmental taxes is not 
visible: the focus is on ensuring national growth through the national position taken in the 
negotiations prior before the Rio Conventions. In developing climate politics, many 
processes were initiated. The Interministerial Climate Group established in 1989 is one 
example I will return to below. I grant a relatively large amount of space to a speech given 
by the leader of the Environmental Tax Committee to illustrate the dualism of the focus 
during a period of uncertainty in environmental politics. As the solution became more clear, 
extensive work was carried out to promote Norway‟s view prior to the Rio Conventions. The 
closure on one solution, i.e. the production of an international level within national 
environmental politics, paved the way for Norway being able to avoid open controversy, 
while ensuring that Norway‟s position had to be reflected at the Rio Convention on Climate 
Change.   
3.5.1 A dawning international focus on environmental challenges 
The SIMEN project pertained to national opportunities to reduce CO2-emissions and these 
were framed within the year 2000, the Interministerial Climate Group, established in 1989, 
organized the KLØKT project. In KLØKT, the timeframe was extended to ”...2025, in line 
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with the IPCC”.137 Additionally and more importantly, the project‟s task was to investigate 
what effects an international agreement would have on the Norwegian economy and growth 
in different scenarios. The background for this was a dawning international focus on 
environmental challenges.  
In accordance with recommendations in Our Common Future, the UN decided to 
organize a global conference; the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro 1992, a conference popularly known as the “Rio 
Earth Summit”. The aim was to shape strategies and methods to lead the development in a 
more sustainable direction, both nationally and internationally.
138
 Between 1987 and 1992 
there was a growing focus on environmental and climate issues within the international 
community. The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) set up a number of 
meetings from 1988 until the “Rio Earth Summit” in 1992.139 In this phase, when 
international climate politics was being established, Norway participated in a working group 
within the IPCC. The task was to consider different scenarios involving emissions and 
mechanisms of implementation. The subgroup called the Response Strategies Working 
Group (RSWG) organized a series of meetings from January 1989 until August 1990.
140
 Via 
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the work of the Interministerial Climate Group, Norway directed its international climate-
political work towards this subgroup of the IPCC.
141
   
There were six regional conferences prior to the “Rio Earth Summit”. Norway hosted 
one of these, the ECE Regional Conference in Bergen in May 1990.
142
 The Second World 
Climate Conference (WCC-II) was held in November 1990 by the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO).
143
 Norway had a secretarial function at the WCC-II.
144
 From January 
1991 until June 1992, official negotiating rounds took place regarding the Rio 
Conventions.
145
 From the second half of 1991, it was clear that Norwegian climate politics 
was about to gain a position internationally in the forthcoming climate convention. But in 
what way and with which means? The solution that was chosen was to try garner support 
internationally to establish a financial mechanism called a “clearing house”.146 In the 
negotiations, this was termed “joint implementation” and the way to do this was by 
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establishing an international “stock-exchange” for CO2-emissions, a clearing house, so to 
speak. I will return to this process and describe the actors and initiatives later in this part.  
The independent research institution CICERO was established in 1989.  Together with 
ECON and the Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI), CICERO represented the development of 
expertise in Norwegian climate policy.
147
 This expertise contributed to the knowledge and 
establishment of what we might call Norwegian climate politics.
148
 
Norway participated in several of the international initiatives on climate issues. This 
emerging field focusing on climate issues affected Norway in such a way that several 
interministerial investigations and processes were established from 1989 onwards. In tandem 
with the emerging focus on climate issues internationally, there was a gradual recognition of 
the need to incorporate nationally international initiatives within national environmental 
politics. Below we will look into this broad and profound initiative to link the international 
with the national in the form of the Interministerial Climate Group. Between the national and 
the international levels in environmental politics, there was an administrative level that 
linked the two levels. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for handling state finances and, 
should conflicting ambitions arise, the ministry has to help bring about a solution. The 
ministry was an important actor in environmental politics. It was not just the glue between 
the levels, but was also tasked with acknowledged what was emerging and acting upon it.  
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3.6 Inter-ministerial initiatives and overlapping 
representatives 
In August 1989, the Interministerial Climate Group was established to prepare a basis for 
decision-making for the Government in relation to a future international climate 
agreement.
149
 This is one of several initiatives that contributed to the development of climate 
politics. Other interministerial initiatives included the Norwegian delegation to the 
negotiations on the Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Rio de 
Janeiro, and a forum initiated by the State Secretary at the Ministry of the Environment in 
January 1991, the “forum for international agreements”.150 There was an overlap in the 
different climate political groups formed in connection with the establishment of climate 
politics in 1989-1992.
151
 Some of the representatives were the same in several of the 
initiatives. When comparing the ministries` participation, the Ministry of Finance appears 
more often than any other ministry in interministerial initiatives. The Interministerial 
Climate Group consisted of representatives from nine ministries and the Prime Minister‟s 
Office (SMK).
152
 The work within the Interministerial Climate Group was described as 
being a “slow and heavy process”.153 It is the Budget Department that described the process 
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in a letter to the Minister of Finance, Sigbjørn Johnsen.
154
 Secretary General Olaf Sætersdal 
of the Ministry of the Environment was appointed chair of the Climate Group.
155
 The Group 
conducted a large number of research projects, approximately forty investigations in all.
156
 
The KLØKT project was one of these.
157
 Within the Interministerial Climate Group, there 
were several representatives from the Ministry of Finance.
158
 The Ministry was also 
represented in the Environmental Tax Committee and of the Norwegian delegation to the 
negotiations in Rio de Janeiro with Thorvald Moe.
159
 Nicolaisen was a member of the 
Environmental Tax Committee and the “forum for international agreements”.160 Within the 
”forum”, Nicolaisen again met Erik Birkeland from the Ministry of the Environment. 
Birkeland had been at the Ministry of the Environment until summer 1991 when he switched 
jobs to the Norwegian Polar Institute. Kåre Bryn from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
also a member of the Norwegian Interministerial Climate Group, the “forum for international 
agreements” and the Norwegian delegation to the negotiations in Rio de Janeiro.161 Olav 
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Prestmo from the Ministry of Transport and Communications was a member of the 
Environmental Tax Committee and the Norwegian Interministerial Climate Group.
162
 
External members included Ted Hanisch, Director of CICERO. From autumn 1990, he was 
an observer/member of the Norwegian delegation on negotiations concerning the Climate 
Convention in Rio de Janeiro; in addition he had been State Secretary at the Prime Minister‟s 
Office in Brundtland‟s government up to 1989. Professor Michael Hoel was also associated 
with CICERO at this point. He was a member of the Environmental Tax Committee and a 
part of his work as a researcher was CO2 quotas.
163
 As this review shows, the same 
representatives met in several of the interministerial initiatives. Indeed, the Interministerial 
Climate Group, the Norwegian delegation to the negotiations in Rio de Janeiro and the 
“forum for international agreements” greatly overlap as far as individual members are 
concerned. In addition, the Ministry of Finance‟s representatives are more numerous than 
those of other sector ministries. The Environmental Tax Committee‟s mandate did not 
include scrutinizing the international climate, unlike the other initiatives mentioned above; 
nevertheless, the Committee was affected by the emerging focus on an international climate 
agreement as I have shown in the second phase outlining the Committee‟s work. Below, I 
will elaborate on this transition.  
3.7 Latent controversy in times of unrest  
Thorvald Moe played a key role in establishing both national and international climate 
politics, so it seems appropriate to devote rather a large amount of space to his speech below. 
Economists at the Ministry of Finance were realizing the effects an international agreement 
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might have on the Norwegian economy. It is within this context Moe`s reflections may be 
viewed.   At one point the process was open; there was no clear direction vis-à-vis which 
solution would be chosen in environmental politics. An example of this open situation is the 
speech Moe gave at a Nordic Natural Gas seminar in August 1990 in Denmark. The subject 
was Norwegian attempts to use environmental taxes.
164
 At the time of the seminar, he was 
Financial Advisor at the Ministry of Finance and Deputy Secretary General.
165
 In 1989, Moe 
was appointed leader of the Environmental Tax Committee. In the speech, it is obvious that 
the Environmental Tax Committee‟s chair expected an international climate agreement to 
emerge. The speech can be read as an indication of the positioning of Norwegian interests 
internationally, and, at the same time, the expert, the economist Moe, brings in his own 
opinion of the use of environmental taxes nationally. 
3.7.1 Committee leader sitting on the fence 
The Environmental Tax Committee worked from December 1989 until February 1992; this 
corresponds to the time period within which climate politics in Norway were developed. In 
the speech, Moe speaks warmly of environmental taxes, and relates these to negative 
externalities and Pigou taxes, well-known terms in thinking related to environmental 
taxes.
166
 Moe states: ”Fossil fuels include, as we know, many products (different types of oil, 
coal, coke, gas) that contribute to different types of emissions (CO2, SO2, NOX, Pb and 
particles). The various emissions contribute to different environmental challenges. 
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Consumers are numerous and heterogeneous. These circumstances seem to favour using tax 
policy as an instrument to reduce these emissions in a cost-effective way”.167  
According to economic reasoning, an increase in the use of environmental taxes 
seemed proper, but this was not to take place. The reason for this may be linked to some of 
Moe`s other points in the speech. It seems as though Moe relates national work to 
international work by recognizing that international climate agreements do exist and by 
acknowledging that they will eventually include climate gases as well. Concerning the 
existing international agreements, for example on NOX and SO2, Moe said that their design, 
based on equal percentage reductions, was not necessarily the design that future agreements 
would be based on. He gave an example by saying: ”...The location of CO2-emissions is of 
no importance…the emissions should be reduced where they originate and do the most 
damage”.168  
During the summer and autumn of 1991, it became clear that Norway wanted a 
financial mechanism where investments in reductions abroad could be credited in the 
national obligations. This is what was to be called joint implementation; the way to 
implement it was through a ”clearing house”.169 At the time of Moe`s speech, in August 
1990, it does not seem as if the principle of joint implementation had yet found form at the 
Ministry of Finance.  
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Moe continues his speech, and mentions the 1991 budget: “Instead of a tax on the 
emissions, it is a tax on the individual fossil fuels for 1991”.170 It is the introduction of CO2-
taxes on petrol, mineral oil and on gas he is speaking of. In the budget proposal for the 1991 
budget, it became clear that coal, coke and domestic gas use were to be exempt from CO2-
taxes. These significant exemptions contradicted the chair of the Committee‟s reasons for 
environmental taxes on fossil fuels. Moe emphasizes the differences in Norwegian power-
supply conditions compared to other countries; Norway bases its domestic power supply on 
hydroelectricity, implying that ”CO2-emissions in Norway have to come from fixed, direct 
use of fossil fuels or the transport sector. In a short-term perspective there is just a small 
possibility for substitute products in the transport sector”.171 This point may be viewed as 
defending Norway‟s position – or at least that Moe, and the Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 
expect a certain amount of discrimination due to Norway‟s national energy supply. ”...Other 
countries can achieve considerable reductions in the emissions from coal- or oil power plants 
by transferring to gas power plants”, Moe maintained.172 It was with this kind of reasoning 
that the thought emerge that Norway still could maintain its petroleum production in a 
situation with a climate agreement.  
Moe`s speech can be read as though he, both personally and professionally, believes 
in an increase in the use of environmental taxes, but at the same time he also considers his 
own position and the position of economic politics in terms of the repercussions an 
international climate agreement might have. The speech can be interpreted as though Moe 
were sitting on the fence, between the national and international levels; or perhaps he 
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acknowledges the national and the international. Moe mentioned the introduction of CO2-
taxes, which were controversial at the time, in his speech. When CO2-taxes were introduced 
in 1991, the decision to tax only certain types of fuel was not in accordance with the 
reasoning on which such taxation was based. Due to the uncertain situation in environmental 
politics, this inconsistency between reasoning and practice may be an example of the 
uncertain strategic direction environmental politics was taking.  
3.7.2 First step in pioneering regulation 
In the white paper concerning the follow-up of the World Commission, the Government 
argued that the highest taxes should be on energy sources that emit the most CO2, similar to 
SO2 from mineral oil; the level of taxes should be based on the level of contamination.
173
 
The SIMEN project recommended a CO2-tax on all fossil fuels. In the budget for 1991, CO2 
taxes were introduced on petrol, mineral oil and gas.
174
 Norway was pioneering within the 
field of environmental regulations by introducing CO2-taxes at this point in time. 
Nevertheless, if the Government had followed its own arguments, mineral oil should have 
been more highly taxed than petrol as this would have correlated to the theoretical economic 
incentives on which it had based its presumptions. Moreover, coal and coke should also have 
been taxed with a CO2 tax. The CO2 tax was formulated thus: 275NOK p/t on petrol and 
110NOK p/t on mineral oil.
175
   
Concerning CO2 taxes on coal and coke, the Ministry of the Environment prioritized 
SO2 taxes on these energy sources rather than a CO2 tax: “The Ministry of the Environment 
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wishes to extend the SO2 tax and include coal and coke. The Ministry of the Environment 
would prioritize this suggestion over a CO2 tax on coal and coke.“.
176
 In the budgetary 
proposition for the 1991 budget, the Government wanted to investigate environmental, 
industrial and economic effects before further CO2-taxes were introduced on coal and 
coke.
177
 In the budget proposal, the Government said the proposals was ”...the first step in an 
escalation of environmental taxes on fossil fuels”.178  
At this point in time, the opportunities for gas exports were acknowledged within the 
Ministry of Finance. ”Clean Norwegian natural gas” could be exported at the expense of coal 
and oil fired power plants in European countries. Norway would then maintain its petroleum 
production, sell its natural resources and contribute to the environment thanks to “cleaner 
gas”; this was the argument. In connection with this, one should mention that as early as in 
the Long-Term Programme 1990-1993 in 1989 it had been mentioned that Norwegian gas 
could become an alternative to other energy sources of fossil fuels with high emissions of 
CO2.
179
 An example of this is when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote to the Ministry of 
Finance in August 1989: ”...gas as a source of energy is an environmentally friendly 
alternative unlike other fossil fuels such as coal and oil. This can make Norwegian gas 
interesting as an alternative energy source in Europe in the future”.180  
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During the 1991 budget debate in autumn 1990, the Syse Government resigned. At 
the beginning of November, Brundtland became Prime Minister of a minority government. 
In their alternative budget proposal, the Labour Party signalled that ”...CO2-taxes are to be 
extended to more users of fossil fuels”.181 The Labour Party did, however, support the 
former Government in its proposal to postpone a general tax on CO2 until the Environmental 
Tax Committee had submitted its report.
182
 In relation to the 1991 budget, CO2-taxation of 
emissions of CO2 from petroleum activity on the continental shelf was introduced together 
with a CO2 tax on petrol and mineral oil, as mentioned. The CO2 tax on petroleum activity 
on the continental shelf was set at 0.60 NOK, but in reality it was much lower as it was tax 
deductible. In its recommendations, the Ministry of Finance emphasized that ”The CO2 tax is 
not supposed to be a tax on the production of petroleum”, but rather a tax on the combustion 
of gas in the flare gas systems and when flaring is used.
183
 The Ministry of Finance was 
precise in its wording, emphasizing that this tax was not a tax on production. At the same 
time, no CO2 taxes were introduced on domestic power-intensive industry that used fossil 
fuels as an energy source.  
What happened was that Norway was the first country to introduce CO2 taxes, a 
pioneer within CO2 taxes. SIMEN had recommended a CO2 tax on all fossil fuels, and the 
Government had stated that this initial introduction was the “first step in an escalation” of 
environmental taxes on CO2. In the second part of 1991, Norway assumed an active stance 
within international climate politics; the solution to the conflicting goals of environmental 
and economic politics was to focus on the international level and the effects of an 
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international climate agreement on the Norwegian economy. Establishing a clearing-house 
system was thus proposed. The material does not give an answer to where precisely the idea 
of a clearing-house comes from. The Government waited before introducing further 
restrictions nationally that could affect Norwegian industry, transportation, regional policy 
and future growth in expectation of the restrictions that might appear in a future international 
climate agreement.  
3.7.3 Ensuring national growth by the production of new politics 
In connection with the World‟s Second Climate Conference (WCC-II) organized by WMO 
in November 1990, Norway had taken upon itself the responsibility of being the secretariat 
to the conference. Differing opinions within the ministries show that this responsibility was 
to a certain extent controversial within the ministries. There was no unanimous agreement 
about being the secretariat at the conference. 
 It seems as though the Ministry of Finance had, by this point in time, made up its 
mind about which foundation and attitude Norway was to have towards an international 
climate agreement. At the same time, it is apparent that the Ministry of Finance and the 
Ministry of the Environment had conflicting goals regarding what they wanted the content of 
Norway‟s view to be towards the conference.184 It was the Planning Department that fronted 
the ministry‟s view to the Ministry of the Environment. The Planning Department believed 
the Norwegian delegation should not emphasize their main argument to be a goal of numeric 
sizes and timeframes for emission reductions in the conversations at the WCC-II.
185
 The 
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background for this was that the Planning Department at the Ministry of Finance understood 
the situation in advance of the WCC-II as follows: first, within the EU there was no 
agreement concerning stabilizing CO2 by the year 2000: several countries opposed this, such 
as Spain, Portugal, Greece and Great Britain. Second, the Planning Department stated that 
the USA would not meet at a political level, but was sending a scientist to head their 
delegation.
186
 The goal of the Norwegian delegation was to achieve a 20% reduction by 2005 
or 2010. The Planning Department thus asks rhetorically: ”Would it be possible to achieve 
more by more strongly emphasizing/trying to gain support for what the industrial countries 
at the least should do in the years to come?”. It is continued: ”The main aim would be to 
avoid a sticky discussion about long-term goals and to make the USA (and other laggards 
such as Great Britain) do more than they have wanted to do so far”.187 On these grounds, the 
Ministry of Finance suggested in October 1990 that the Norwegian delegation drop its earlier 
goal of a 20% reduction in emissions by 2005 or 2010.  
 What repercussions did this have for Norway‟s stabilization goal? Can this be 
understood as the Ministry of Finance in October 1990 having no intention of attempting to 
adhere to the national stabilization goal from 1989? In line with the IPCC, the 
Interministerial Climate Group in the KLØKT project had adjusted the year of reference to 
the international with a horizon until 2025. Is it so that the Ministry of Finance wishes that 
the international society are to develop the best effort in the negotiations and by that this was 
a constructive input where ”everybody was in”, or was this an expression for the Ministry of 
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Finance believing that Norway‟s unilateral goal of stabilization was not a solution that 
followed the ministry‟s practice of the cost-effective administration of natural resources?  
Specifically, the Ministry of Finance wishes that the minister statement being 
developed for the WCC-II should be based on “The precautionary principle and cost 
effective agreements and instruments”.188 This implies, according to the department, that the 
Ministry of Finance believes the following three preconditions must be followed up. First, 
“…limiting emissions must be set independent of borders”; second, “…the agreement must 
include all climate gasses, not just CO2”: third, “…the agreement should enjoy broad 
approval from all major industrial countries”.189 The Ministry of Finance wanted the 
Norwegian delegation to the WCC-II to work actively towards making these principles 
reflected in the ministerial statement.
190
 The Planning Department at the Ministry of Finance 
commented on the proposal from the Ministry of the Environment, saying: “In the opinion of 
the Ministry of the Environment, Norway shall not oppose any suggestion that implement a 
programme with the aim of a 20% reduction in the total emissions of climate gases in the 
industrialized countries. The Ministry of Finance thinks Norway instead should suggest an 
investigation of possible reductions for now”.191 At this point in time, there were no 
calculations showing the repercussions for economic growth involving different scenarios 
for the reduction of emissions for Norway, and the Planning Department emphasized this 
uncertainty. The Ministry of Finance aim at the ongoing KLØKT project in the 
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Interministerial Climate Group and said the following: ”it is not possible to take a standpoint 
vis-à-vis possible reduction goals before the actual investigation, the climate investigation, 
has been completed and there is a calculation of the costs of different levels of reductions of 
emissions. These costs may soar and have an enormous influence on economic growth and 
societal development”.192 The KLØKT project had not yet been completed: it was to 
scrutinize such scenarios involving different levels of reductions and the possible 
repercussions for the Norwegian economy. 
 It is obvious that the secretarial role was controversial within the ministries; in 
addition, the ministries‟ goals conflicted. The Ministry of Transportation and 
Communications commented on the situation thus: ”The extent to which Norway is to be 
responsible for “secretarial tasks” in international environmental work should be discussed 
in advance at a political level here at home. That has not occurred in this specific case”.193 
The Ministry of Transportation and Communications continued: “We would also like to 
address the obvious problems that lie in the fact that Norway in reality has assumed a 
secretarial responsibility for the ministerial conference in an area where numerous national 
political questions remain unclear. There is a clear danger that this could lead to obligations 
and create doubt about Norwegian standpoints in the international climate negotiations”.194 
There were no consensuses between the ministries about the position Norway should take in 
the international negotiations at this point. The Ministry of Transport and Communications 
could not perceive any clear consensus or a clear Norwegian position within environmental 
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politics. The ”Norway” that had taken responsibility for being secretary was the Ministry of 
the  Environment (in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) without any specific 
discussion in advance of this decision.
195
 Concerning the ministerial statement, the Ministry 
of Transport and Communications wanted to stress lack of involvement and wrote: ”The 
Ministry of Transport and Communications wants it to be expressed in the letter of 
recommendation who has formulated the Norwegian document. We would ask that the word 
“we”, the first time it is mentioned, be altered to „The Ministry of Environment in 
cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs‟”.196  
There were differing opinions at the various ministries regarding Norway‟s official 
strategy in international environmental policy. The situation was unclear throughout 1990. 
Above, it is indicated the way in which the chair of the Environmental Tax Committee 
illustrates this situation. In addition, the introduction of CO2-taxes did not follow the 
government‟s own theoretical reasoning for such taxes: in addition, the last section has 
demonstrated how differing opinions within three ministries were expressed on process and 
strategy vis-à-vis the World‟s Second Climate Conference. A focus on the international 
seems to emerge much due to a strong belief in not weakening economic growth 
potentialities nationally. The idea of an emerging international focus had now been 
established. Public civil servants were about to develop new political practices in day-to-day 
politics.  
                                              
195
 Ibid. 
196
 PA, tidsrom 1990-1994, arkivboks nr. 15, arkivmappe 105.54 Miljøvern, brev fra Sfd til Md 
27.10.1990. 
72 
 
3.8 Producing politics  
This section will look into the specific, practical efforts made to establish an international 
level within the national level of environmental politics. From late 1990 until the Rio 
Conventions, several efforts were made to establish the international level and to position 
Norway within the frameworks of the forthcoming international climate agreement. Below, I 
will outline how the KLØKT line of reference (referansebane: my comment) was forced 
upon both international and national environmental investigations in order to “avoid 
difficulties” and misunderstandings that might appear with differing lines of reference. 197 
This means that a line of reference involving an international aim was to be the foundation 
for the national investigation of the Environmental Tax Committee. Other specific examples 
I will return to in this section include the first difficult attempts to develop a quota system 
and the definition of “Norway‟s view” in the international negotiations prior to the Rio 
Conventions. 
How could the international aspect be made important in a national investigation 
pertaining to environmental taxes in Norway?  The background for this may be found in a 
decision to make the KLØKT line of reference a basis for the Environmental Tax 
Committee, the Interministerial Climate Group and the Revised Long-Term Programme.
198
 
The KLØKT project was conducted by SSB. The report discussed two things; first, the 
repercussions for Norway‟s economy if Norway were to unilaterally attain a goal of 
stabilizing Norwegian CO2-emissions. Second, there was a discussion to co-ordinate 
international politics to reduce CO2-emissions globally and the effects of this on Norwegian 
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economy.
199
 In KLØKT, in contrast to SIMEN, the repercussions of an international 
agreement were included and the year of reference was 2025. SIMEN only investigated 
national instruments and the year of reference was 2000.  
In autumn 1990, the Planning Department provided a review of ongoing long-term 
economic calculations. The calculations were to be finished by the end of November that 
year. The final report from the KLØKT project was expected to be submitted to the 
Interministerial Climate Group by February 1991. ”A line of reference is planned showing 
the emissions of climate gasses in a state of balanced economic growth until 2025 without 
further environmental steps. This line is based on new calculations for oil from the Ministry 
of Petroleum and Energy and calculations for NB91 (national budget: my comment). 
Preliminary results show that environmental goals which have already been decided on will 
not be achieved without further steps. The calculations of the Environmental Tax Committee 
will be based on KLØKT calculations…”.200 With a common line of reference for the 
Environmental Tax Committee, the Interministerial Climate Group and the revised Long-
Term Programme ”difficulties will be avoided in terms of what the Government uses as basis 
for its long-term policy, including environmental politics,” writes Nicolaisen from the 
Planning Department: he also claims the common line of reference should be identical to the 
KLØKT calculations mentioned above.
201
 In this way, the Environmental Tax Committee 
acquired a line of reference established due to international climate agreement 
considerations. 
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Norway was already obliged to reduce emissions released into the air by several 
international environmental agreements, including the NOX-agreement, the SO2-agreement 
and the Montreal agreement.
202
 The way these agreements were developed built on a equal 
reduction in percent in all countries bound by the agreements. Norway came to acknowledge 
that this form of agreement should be replaced by ”second-generation agreements”, meaning 
reductions where emissions do most damage.
203
 From the second half of 1991, Norway 
achieved a clear position in international climate politics.
204
 
3.8.1 Starting line for a system of tradable quotas  
The Ministry of Finance decided during summer 1991 to finance a study of tradable quota 
permits. The study was organized by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD).
205
 Prior to the study, representatives of the Ministry of Finance 
expressed what should be emphasized in the contents of the study.
206
 This implies that the 
UN organization UNCTAD had also implemented an initiative to develop joint 
implementation as a solution within the framework of an international climate agreement. 
The Ministry of Finance provided explicit input for the study.  Norway wanted the study to 
focus on a solution involving a separation in on one hand the market for quotas, and on the 
other hand the control of obligations. In addition, the representatives of the ministry believed 
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it was important to look at the actual process of developing a system for tradable quotas. 
Professor Michael Hoel was to provide an expert eye for the study and the Director of 
ECON, Kjell Roland, was mentioned as the potential editor of one of the chapters.
207
 At this 
point in time, Hoel was member of the Environmental Tax Committee and was a researcher 
into international CO2-quota systems. It is possible that his contribution within the 
Environmental Tax Committee had led to the Ministry of Finance, at some time during 1991, 
looking into the possibility of using tradable quotas as part of the solution to global climate 
challenges.  
 In the final report from the Interministerial Climate Group submitted in March 1991, 
thoughts already seem to be dawning of a system involving trading quotas. In the report, one 
of the number of main conclusions consisted of a preliminary and vague formulation of joint 
implementation. The report states that countries or regions jointly could fulfill the necessary 
goal of emission reductions.
208
 In the material surveyed by this thesis, this is the first time a 
joint implementation has appeared. One of the most profound investigations by the Climate 
Group was the KLØKT project. And in a later revised report from the KLØKT project, the 
possibility of joint implementation is repeated, with less vague wording.
209
  
3.8.2 The Norwegian view  
Within the Ministry of Finance, there was a desire to contribute to the formation of 
Norway‟s view in international climate politics. The ministry emphasized its role in the 
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international work concerning a climate agreement already in March 1990.
210
 It is obvious 
that the Economic Policy Department and the Planning Department wanted to be included in 
this work. They expressed their opinion to the Secretary General in a letter that went via 
Thorvald Moe: “Since efforts against climate gases may have considerable macroeconomic 
repercussions, the Ministry of Finance should also participate actively in developing the 
Norwegian point of view for the negotiations”.211 In the letter, which provides an overview 
of the ministry‟s work in the Interministerial Climate Group, the two departments asked that 
the ministry should play an active part in establishing “Norway‟s view”.      
Other ministries also wanted to be involved in developing Norway‟s view and position 
in the climate negotiations. The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy was well aware of the 
challenging situation the Norwegian petroleum sector was facing in terms of the regulation 
on CO2-emissions either nationally or internationally. The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
expressed its concerns and suggested solution to the Ministry of Finance thus: ”Because of 
the strong growth in CO2-emissions, an international agreement founded on a harmonization 
(of regulations: my comment) would indeed be preferable instead of national stabilization 
programmes. It will then be possible for Norway, at a considerable growth rate, to increase 
our emissions in line with our superior national comparative advantages”.212  
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Ted Hanisch, Director of CICERO, joined the Norwegian negotiating delegation to 
the Climate Convention in Rio de Janeiro in late autumn 1990. Archival records show that 
Hanisch was active in his work to garner support for the Norwegian proposal prior to the Rio 
Conventions. In Nilsen‟s thesis of the development of  ”Norway‟s view”, Hanisch plays a 
key role in the international negotiations concerning the climate convention. In the data I 
have reviewed, it seems that Hanisch was the relationship builder who implemented policy. 
With his scientific background, he could be an expert in the process of the negotiations prior 
to the signing of the Climate Convention. Hanisch` name appear in relation to approval of 
travel expenses in June 1991 in relation to the negotiation rounds prior the Climate 
Convention and in the finishing line to Rio where he seeks to gain support for Norway‟s 
view in developing countries.
213
 The travelling he did was in line with the Ministry of the 
Environment, but it was the Ministry of Finance that paid his expenses. The basic pillars of 
the Norwegian proposal were based on achieving a breakthrough for cost-effective 
agreements; an agreement including all climate gases and joint implementation.
214
  
From January to December 1991, there were four rounds of negotiations prior to the 
Rio Conventions. In the third round of negotiation, in Nairobi in September 1991, the 
Norwegian delegation‟s emphasis was threefold; first, “taxation and other instruments have 
to be coordinated with other countries”; second, “the fulfillment of obligations to reduce 
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emission must occur in cooperation with different countries and by taking steps against 
various climate gasses”; third, “ a certain mechanism is suggested, a “clearing house”, to 
ensure the possibility of such cooperation”.215 This is obvious from a status report sent to the 
Minister of Finance, Sigbjørn Johnsen. The Norwegian delegation experienced optimism and 
support for their proposal in the negotiations. An enthusiastic representative of the Ministry 
of Finance sent the report “home”.216 The report is optimistic on Norway‟s behalf in relation 
to the ”most important substance in the Norwegian suggestions”.217 This pertains to the 
possibility that joint implementation may become part of the agreement. 
The most important aspect to the Norwegian proposal concerning the Convention on 
Climate Change was the establishment of a “clearing house”.218 During negotiations, 
CICERO‟s Director, Ted Hanisch, together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, worked 
actively to garner support for the Norwegian proposal.
219
 If the proposal were supported, 
Norway could buy quotas abroad instead of investing in national reductions of emissions to 
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solve the politically locked situation vis-à-vis national stabilization goals. The Economic 
Policy Department wrote: ”...as of today it does not seem unreasonable to assume that the 
most important substance in the Norwegian suggestions is to be reflected in the convention. 
This will imply in part that Norway will have the freedom to fulfill its goal of stabilization 
by virtue of investments abroad rather than action nationally to reduce emissions”.220 This 
shows that the Ministry of Finance participated actively in the development of Norway‟s 
view in the international climate negotiations. It was now official Norwegian policy that 
joint implementation by virtue of a ”clearing house” was Norway‟s position.   
Ted Hanisch had discussions with the World Bank about a “clearing house” in 
November 1991, Hanisch reported home.
221
 It is especially the work on financial 
mechanisms and ways of effects for a clearing-house that was the focus of the conversations. 
A summary from the meeting was sent to the Ministry of Finance. In November, CICERO 
and Ted Hanisch published a policy note on joint implementation of commitments to curb 
climate change.
222
 In December, a seminar was held by CICERO concerning the notion of 
the clearing house on behalf of the Interministerial Climate Group and the Ministry of the 
Environment.
223
 The seminar was part of Norway‟s strategy to garner support for its view 
joint implementation. Hanisch describes the seminar thus: ”the aim of the seminar is to lay 
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open and discuss broadly, to a certain extent, the Norwegian suggestion of a “clearing 
house” as part of the financial mechanism of the Climate Convention”.224 CICERO and 
Hanisch played a key role as mediators of Norway‟s view in the international negotiations 
and in establishing relational bonds with potential supporters. CICERO had no projects 
directly with the Interministerial Climate Group, but through Hanisch‟s engagement, 
CICERO was closely associated with the development of Norwegian climate politics in this 
time period.
225
  
The optimism that maybe read in the report from Nairobi in the third round of 
negotiation took a dramatic turn in the fifth round in New York in February 1992. Closing in 
on the UNCED in Rio where the climate convention are to be signed, the Norwegian 
delegation found that the support for their suggestion was fading.
226
 Halfway through the 
ten-day long negotiation meeting, Norway was met with resistance to its desire for a 
common goal for OECD countries and the important suggestion (for Norway) of joint 
implementation. The Norwegian UN delegation commented on the mood of the negotiations 
as follows: ”As far as the Norwegian side is concerned, we must state that there is a negative 
development regarding our negotiations…” They continued: “…the suggestion concerning 
joint implementation does not seem to have any wind in its sails. India that had previously 
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lent support, believes the suggestion has become bilateral since Germany launched its 
version of joint implementation at the last meeting”.227  
In developing Norway‟s view of international climate politics, the climate convention 
and signing the convention in Rio had always been what the ministry was working towards , 
and the same applied to Ted Hanisch and the work of the Interministerial Climate Group. 
Now the strategy had to be dropped once more. The next milestone in an international 
context was the Kyoto agreement in 1997. Joint implementation was to become a part of that 
agreement through the Clean Development Mechanism. Closing in on the UNCED, the 
Norwegian delegation notes their proposal are losing support.
228
 In Rio de Janeiro, the 
climate convention was to be signed in June 1992. 
3.9 Brief account of Part II 
In this section, we have seen the emerging interest and focus on climate issues within the 
international community. When the UN decided to organize the UNCED in Rio in 1992, the 
conference became a point of reference, something to work towards, in terms of the 
international efforts towards formulating a climate agreement. The initiative of the 
Norwegian Interministerial Climate Group did provide a foundation for national climate 
politics. There was a latent controversy that never broke the surface; rather it was handled 
within the ministry. The period is characterized by uncertainty in strategic choices in 
environmental politics. The formulation of the CO2-taxes shows an inconsistency between 
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theoretical economic reasoning and the way in which these taxes were formulated, and at the 
WCC-II there were clearly differing opinions within the ministries regarding the role 
Norway should play at the conference. From the second half of 1990, Norway focused on the 
repercussions of an international climate agreement and positioned its proposal to ensure 
future national wealth. The solution which emerged was the proposal to establish the 
financial mechanism of a clearing house in order to implement “joint implementation”. To a 
certain extent, Reitan writes of the levels in climate politics: she claims that, in climate 
politics, the question of using instruments was moved up to the global level in the period 
1989-1996.
229
 But instead, was it in fact the case that important aspects in Norwegian 
national environmental politics were simply moved up to an international level? I would say, 
based on my findings in the material, that this was not so. Environmental taxes did not find a 
place in the international political arena as they had in the national arena in Norway prior to 
1990. And the international was not obvious in 1989, but rather later, from 1991. My 
analysis shows that the question of environmental taxes became less important. Moreover, it 
was the international that gained room in the national. There was a waiting and expectant 
attitude vis-à-vis the upcoming international climate agreement. In relation to this it was not 
the economical instruments that were discussed. The positioning that occurred in order for 
Norway to have the best out of an agreement became the overall focus at the beginning of 
the 1990s. The national concern became international.  
                                              
229
 Reitan 1998. 
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4. Conclusion 
How do we organize our complex society, structures of societal life and institutions? By 
understanding how practices of politics emerge and establish new politics of administration, 
I hope I have contributed to the field of studying politics in the making, politics that is not 
just politics, but science, society and technology in an intertwined and evolving mix.  
Within the Ministry of Finance, economic growth and environmental protection were 
constructed to be a clash of interests. To solve this, economists focused on the repercussions 
on national economic wealth in a case of an international agreement. As I have shown in the 
last part of the analysis, this was in a way “solved” by the production of a new level within 
environmental politics. It has not been my intention to unmask the Ministry of Finance as a 
calculating and technocratic ministry. Rather, I have tried to understand what contributes to 
making politics. It is with this ambition I have approached the ministry and the economists‟ 
role in environmental politics.  
As to the theoretical resources I have drawn on, I found controversy studies helpful in 
understanding how the latent controversy in this story did not become an open controversy. 
This thesis shows that controversies that are not open are also part of the formation of 
politics and society and therefore they need to be studied and can be studied with the same 
theoretical resources as situations which are inherently controversial. Controversy studies 
were one of two main theoretical resources that have been applied in this thesis. The other 
theoretical resource was the processes of opening and closure. The latter has been widely 
used in studies of technology. It is with the knowledge of and theoretical basis in these 
resources I have attempted to study a process of politics in the making. In the material, there 
was no definite period in time when the debate concerning environmental taxes closed: there 
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is a rather sliding transition towards the international. The process of politics in this story 
can be viewed as an example of studying political practice closely by following the 
practitioners of politics. The national level of environmental politics became unpredictable 
while a process of closure took place. The solution in environmental politics was to focus on 
the financial mechanism of a clearing house within what was termed joint implementation.  
Although economists, politics and the process involved are the objects of this study, 
nature is a part of it as well. My intention was not to study nature per se, or even climate 
gases threatening the world as we know it with global warming, but rather the specific work 
practices that translate entities of nature and make them governable. CO2 is made governable 
through this process. It became measurable, quantified and tradable. In this sense, nature is 
not the starting point but rather the endpoint of scientific, societal and political interventions. 
How does this case provide insight? By being a real example of politics in the making 
supported by accessible documentation. The archives at the Ministry of Finance have not 
been used in earlier works in the field in this time period. In addition to approaching the task 
within an STS perspective, trying to open up the inner workings of politics it has also 
provided new knowledge. New knowledge about the process of handling, or rather avoiding, 
a latent controversy has been gained, and the important role of economists and the Ministry 
of Finance has in developing environmental politics been confirmed.  
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Appendix 1: List of abbreviations 
CICERO Centre for International Climate and Environmental Research - Oslo  
CO2  Carbon dioxide 
ECON  ECON is not an abbreviation, moreover a name that reflects the nature of the |
 companies services 
EU  European Union 
FNI   Fridtjof Nansen Institute 
KLØKT Klima, Økonomi og Tiltak, i.e. Climate, Economy and Initiatives 
NOU  Norges Offentlige Utredninger, i-e. Norway‟s Official Investigations 
NOX  Nitrogen oxide 
OECD  Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PPP   Polluter-Pays-Principle  
SIMEN Studier av Industri, Miljø og Energi,  i.e. Studies of Industry, Environment 
and Energy 
SSB  Central Bureau of Statistics, changed name in 1993 to Statistics Norway 
SO2  Sulphur dioxide 
STS  Science and Technology Studies 
UN  United Nations 
UNCED United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
UNEP  United Nations Environmental Programme 
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change  
WCED World Commission on Environment and Development 
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Appendix 2: List of abbreviations in the archival 
references  
In the archival references I have indicated department in all references. Due to different 
styles of reference practice the references are built up differently in each department. All my 
references to the archives in the Ministry of Finance are written in Norwegian to be as 
accurate as possible according to the archive and archival document I am referring to. All 
documents are in Norwegian.  
Fd:  the Ministry of Finance 
Fid: the Ministry of Fisheries 
Ld: the Ministry of Agriculture 
Md: the Ministry of the Environment 
Nd: the Ministry of Industry 
Oed: the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy 
Sfd: the Ministry of Transport and Communications 
SMK: the Prime Minister‟s Office 
Ud: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
Abbreviations used in references are following the official manual for abbreviations. Please 
see:  http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/om_regjeringen/tidligere/oversikt/del-iii---alfabetisk-
personregister/forkortelser.html?id=418301. All abbreviations in references are written in 
Norwegian. 
stsekr: State Secretary (no.: statssekretær) 
str: Minister of Finance (no.: statsråd) 
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Appendix 3: List of quotes  
The many quotes in the thesis are to be found in the original documents in the archives of the 
Ministry of Finance. Below is a list with all quotes in the empirical data in original language; 
Norwegian and the translation that corresponds to the original text. The list shows chapter, 
note no., archival reference, and original quotes in Norwegian and translation in English.  
Footnote 
64, p. 26 
AT, arkivboks 574.00 1986-1989, arkivmappe 3519, brev fra PA til stsekr 
2.12.88 
Norwegian ”... med sikte på å belyse om/i hvilken grad det teknisk og faglig ligger til 
rette for å ta i bruk miljøavgifter...” 
English “aiming to shed light on and to what degree it is technically and 
professionally acceptable to use environmental taxes” 
  
Footnote 
77, p. 30 
AT, arkivboks 574.00 1986-1989, arkivmappe 3519, notat fra 
Budsjettseksjonen i AT til arbeidsgruppen / 03.01.89. 
Norwegian ”...høye avgifter som pålegges ut fra miljøhensyn, og som har innvirkning på 
tilpasningen i flere næringsgrener, (vil) kunne få konsekvenser i form av 
generelt redusert økonomisk vekst som følge av lavere økonomisk aktivitet i 
samfunnet, økt prisstigning og svekket konkurranseevne ovenfor utlandet” 
English “…high taxes introduced because of the environment, and which at the same 
time have an effect on several branches of industry, will have repercussions 
such as reduced economic growth in general as a result of low economic 
activity in society, price increases and a diminished ability to compete in 
international markets” 
  
Footnote 
79, p. 30 
AT, arkivboks 574.00 1986-1989, arkivmappe 3519, notat fra 
Budsjettseksjonen i AT til arbeidsgruppen 03.01.89 
Norwegian ”...avgifter som virkemiddel til å styre energiforbruket synes å være mest 
effektivt ovenfor husholdningene” 
English “...taxes as an instrument to manage energy consumption seem to be most 
effective in the case of households” 
  
Footnote 
84, p. 32 
AT, arkivboks 574.00 1986-1989, arkivmappe 3519, notat 13.12.1988 
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Norwegian ”Selve ordlyden av en internasjonal avtale om CO2 eller energiforbruk kan 
imidlertid få stor betydning...” 
English ”The exact wording of an international agreement on CO2 or energy 
consumption may be of great importance…” 
  
Footnote 
85, p. 32 
AT, arkivboks 574.00 1986-1989, arkivmappe 3519, notat 13.12.1988 
Norwegian ”...en CO2 avtale som knyttes opp til utslipp pr. innbygger er gunstigere for 
Norge enn en lik %-vis reduksjon i alle land” 
English ”... a CO2 agreement that can be bound to emissions per capita would benefit 
Norway, rather than equal percentage reductions in all countries” 
  
Footnote 
88, p. 33 
AT, arkivboks 574.00 1986-1989, arkivmappe 3519, notat 13.12.1988 
Norwegian ”Oppvarming av husholdninger kan relativt enkelt erstattes med elektrisitet”, 
og han fortsetter: ”...utslippene knyttet til transportmidler kan være svært 
vanskelig å påvirke på grunn av høye inntektselastisiteter og lave 
priselastisiteter” 
English ”Heating households with oil can relatively easily be replaced with 
electricity”; and he continues: ”...emissions stemming from transportation can 
be difficult to influence due to high income elasticity and low price elasticity” 
  
Footnote 
92, p. 35 
AT, arkivboks 574.00 1986-1989, arkivmappe 3519, utkast fra 
arbeidsgruppen til stsekr, kopi finansråd 3/1-1989 
Norwegian ”avgifter som tilsiktet eller utilsiktet virker som en handelshindring kan skape 
reaksjoner og protester fra våre handelspartnere” 
English ”...taxes that deliberately or unintendedly affect trade may cause reactions and 
protests from our trading partners” 
  
Footnote 
93, p. 35 
AT, arkivboks 574.00 1986-1989, arkivmappe 3519, utkast fra 
arbeidsgruppen til stsekr, kopi finansråd 3/1-1989 
Norwegian ”Det er vanskelig å komme utenom at de aktuelle avgiftsendringene vil slå ut 
i økt pris på diesel. Dette vil spesielt ramme transportsektoren og 
transportintensivt konkurranseutsatt næringsliv i distriktene, som for 
eksempel oppdrettsnæringen eller møbel industrien. I den grad det oppstår 
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konkurransevridninger mellom Norge og andre land, kan dette få betydelige 
utslag på konkurranseevnen ovenfor utlandet” 
English “It is difficult to see that the tax changes at hand will not lead to a higher price 
on diesel. This will be particularly noticeable in the transport sector and in 
transportation-intensive, competition-sensitive industry in rural areas, for 
example in fish farming and in the furniture industry. In a case of distortion of 
competition between Norway and other countries, this will considerably affect 
the ability to compete in international markets” 
  
Footnote 
96, p. 36 
AT, arkivboks 574.00 1986-1989, arkivmappe 3519, utkast fra 
arbeidsgruppen til stsekr, kopi finansråd 3/1-1989 
Norwegian ”konsekvensene vil bli uoversiktlige” 
English “consequences that are difficult to follow up” 
  
Footnote 
98, p. 37 
AT, arkivboks 574.00 1986-1989, arkivmappe 3519, utkast fra 
arbeidsgruppen til stsekr, kopi finansråd 3/1-1989 
Norwegian ”...i det økonomiske opplegget for langtidsprogrammet ikke er forutsatt 
vesentlige endringer i prisene på ulike energikilder” 
English ”...in the economic draft in the Long-Term Programme substantial changes 
are not presupposed in the prices of different sources of energy” 
  
Footnote 
99, p. 38 
PA 1988-1989, arkivboks nr. 7, arkivmappe 102.30 Langtidsprogrammet 
1990-1993 generelt, brev fra Skånland til str Fd 29.12.1988 
Norwegian ”...det er en alvorlig inkonsistens i at dersom man lykkes i internasjonale 
avtaler om bruk av fossile brensler så får dette betydning for etterspørselen av 
olje og de prisbaner som er skissert. I den produksjonsbegrensning som vil bli 
resultatet, kan vel neppe vi øke vår oljeproduksjon slik det er forutsatt. En 
vellykket global ressursdisponering vil derfor radikalt forandre programmets 
forutsetninger for petroleumsektoren” 
English  ”...there is a serious inconsistency in the fact that if one succeed in an 
international agreement on the consumption of fossil fuels it will affect the 
demand for oil and the path of price movements that is currently drafted. With 
such a restriction on production, we will not be able to increase our 
production of oil as it is assumed. A successful global disposal of resources 
will radically change the assumptions of the programme in the petroleum 
sector“ 
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Footnote 
103, p. 38 
PA 1988-1989, arkivboks nr. 7, arkivmappe 102.30 Langtidsprogrammet 
1990-1993 generelt, telefax fra Moe og Andersen til PA 28.12.1988 
Norwegian ”Burde man...,...drøfte mer de målkonflikter en her kan stå ovenfor? Burde 
man, bl.a i lys av de optimistiske forutsetningene som er benyttet og den 
usikkerhet man står ovenfor vedrørende den økonomiske utviklingen, være 
noe forsiktigere?” 
English ”Should...,... the conflicting goals that are obvious be additionally discussed? 
Should one be more careful in light of the optimistic presumptions that are 
made and the unsure situation in economic development?” 
  
Footnote 
105, p. 39 
PA 1988-1989, arkivboks nr. 7, arkivmappe 102.30.2 En bærekraftig 
utvikling og et godt miljø, brev fra Sfd 06.12.1988 
Norwegian ”En foreløpig vurdering av utviklingen i energiforbruket av fossile brensler i 
den makroøkonomiske fremskrivingen tyder på at det er alvorlig inkonsistens 
mellom næringsutviklingen i de makroøkonomiske beregningene og målene i 
miljøpolitikken. Mye vil imidlertid avhenge av den eksakte målformuleringen 
om utviklingen i bruken av energi/fossile brensler” 
English ”A preliminary assessment of the macroeconomic extrapolation 
(fremskrivning; my comment) of the development in the consumption of 
energy from fossil fuels shows a severe inconsistency between industrial 
development in the macroeconomic calculations and the goals in 
environmental politics. A great deal depends on the exact formulation of a 
goal for the development of use of energy/fossil fuels” 
  
Footnote 
106, p. 40 
PA 1988-1989, arkivboks nr. 7, arkivmappe 102.30 Langtidsprogrammet 
1990-1993 generelt, brev fra Longva til str Fd 02.01.1989 
Norwegian ”Miljøpolitikken er et vanskelig punkt,....Er trykkingen av R-utkastet på 
skiftevis bleket og ubleket papir et uttrykk for vaklingen i miljøpolitikken?” 
English ”Environmental politics is a tricky issue...Is the printing of the R-draft 
(Governmental draft; my comment) on alternately bleached and unbleached 
paper an expression for the tottering in environmental politics?” 
  
Footnote 
114, p. 44 
AT, arkivnr. 547.00, saksnr. 90/4725-1, internt notat fra FA til Moe 
05.04.1990 
Norwegian ”Bruk av avgifter for å redusere forbruksveksten er her å anse på en 
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kostnadseffektiv måte” 
English ”The use of taxation in order to reduce the increase in consumption is to be 
viewed as cost-efficient” 
  
Footnote 
115, p. 44 
AT, arkivnr. 547.00, saksnr. 90/4725-1, internt notat fra FA til Moe 
05.04.1990 
Norwegian ”Hvorvidt de enkelte forslag representerer en kostnadseffektiv 
virkemiddelbruk er ... høyst uklar” 
English ”whether the different proposals represent a cost-efficient use of instruments 
is…highly unclear”. 
  
Footnote 
116, p. 44 
AT, arkivnr. 547.00, saksnr. 90/4725-1, internt notat fra FA til Moe 
05.04.1990 
Norwegian ”FA vil sterkt fraråde en innføring av panteordning for spillolje” 
English ”The Budget Department strongly advises against an introduction of a system 
for a deposit/return of waste oil” 
  
Footnote 
118, p. 45 
AT, arkivnr. 547.00, saksnr. 90/4725-1, internt notat fra FA til Moe 
05.04.1990 
Norwegian ”dette er en ren budsjettsak og bør tas opp i den ordinære 
budsjettbehandlingen”. 
English ”...this is clearly a budgetary case and should be considered in relation to the 
ordinary discussions of the budget” 
  
Footnote 
121, p. 46 
AT, arkivnr. 547.00, saksnr. 90/4725-2, internt notat fra FA til AT 28.05.1990 
Norwegian ”...det foreslåtte kontrollgebyr for fiskeoppdrett vil ha betydning for 
budsjettets utgiftsside. Det finnes ikke slik kontroll i dag. FA legger til grunn 
at Md eventuelt må ta dette opp i den ordinære budsjettprosessen” 
English ”the suggested tax at hand on the control of fish farming will have an effect 
on the debit side of the budget. There is currently no such control. The Budget 
Department would suggest that the Ministry of the Environment may look at 
this during their regular work on the budget” 
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Footnote 
126, p. 49 
AT, arkivnr. 547.00, saksnr. 90/4725-7, internt notat til finansråden via Moe, 
kopi SØ, FA, PUA, ATA  22.08.1990 
Norwegian ”Utredningen vil reise omfattende og vanskelige spørsmål. Selv om 
utredningen skal ha et langsiktig og prinsipietlt perspektiv, er det vanskelig å 
unngå spørsmål som griper inn i utformingen av den løpende økonomiske 
politikken. Det kan bli vanskelig å håndtere dette i utvalget...” 
English “The investigation will raise comprehensive and difficult questions. While the 
Environmental Tax Committee is supposed to have a long-term and principle 
perspective, it will be difficult to avoid questions that relates to the day-to-day 
economical politics. It can become challenging to handle these in the 
Committee” 
  
Footnote 
139, p. 55 
Rom 30, Rad PA-arkiv, tidsrom 1990-1993, arkivboks nr. 2, arkivmappe 
012.74 Klimautvalget, notat fra ØA og PA til finansråden via Moe 
09.03.1990. 
Norwegian “…2025 i tråd med IPCC” 
English ”...2025, in line with the IPCC” 
  
Footnote 
155, p. 59 
PA, tidsrom 1990-1993, arkivboks nr. 2, arkivmappe 012.74 Klimautvalget, 
notat fra FA til str via Moe og stsekr Øygard, kopi PUA, ØA, SØ, ATA dato 
13.03.1991 
Norwegian “...tungdrevet prosess” 
English “slow and heavy process” 
  
Footnote 
169, p. 62 
AT, arkivnr. 547.00, saksnr. 90/4725-8, manus foredrag Moe 29.08.1990 
Norwegian ”Fossile brensler omfatter som kjent mange produkter (ulike oljetyper, kull, 
koks, gass) som medfører ulike typer utslipp (CO2, SO2, NOX, Pb, VOC, og 
partikler). De  ulike utslippene bidrar til forskjelige miljøproblemer. 
Forbrukerne er mange og uensartede. Disse forhold taler for at 
avgiftspolitikken er et godt egnet virkemiddel for å redusere disse utslippene 
på en kostnadseffektiv måte”. 
English ”Fossil fuels include, as we know, many products (different types of oil, coal, 
coke, gas) that contribute to different types of emissions (CO2, SO2, NOX, Pb 
and particles). The various emissions contribute to different environmental 
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challenges. Consumers are numerous and heterogeneous. These 
circumstances seem to favour using tax policy as an instrument to reduce 
these emissions in a cost-effective way” 
  
Footnote 
170, p. 63 
AT, arkivnr. 547.00, saksnr. 90/4725-8, manus foredrag Moe 29.08.1990 
Norwegian ”...For CO2 har utslippssted ikke betydning for miljøskade.....utslippene bør 
reduseres mest der de gir opphav til størst skade” 
English ”...The location of CO2-emissions is of no importance…the emissions should 
be reduced where they originate and do the most damage” 
  
Footnote 
172, p. 63 
AT, arkivnr. 547.00, saksnr. 90/4725-8, manus foredrag Moe 29.08.1990 
Norwegian ”I stedet for å avgiftsblegge utslippene, har en lagt opp til å avgiftsbelegge de 
enkelte fossile brenslene for 1991” 
English “Instead of a tax on the emissions, it is a tax on the individual fossil fuels for 
1991” 
  
Footnote 
173, p. 64 
AT, arkivnr. 547.00, saksnr. 90/4725-8, manus foredrag Moe 29.08.1990 
Norwegian ”Dette betyr at CO2 utslippene i Norge må redureses fra stasjonær, direkte 
bruk av fossile brensler og transportsektoren. Liten substitusjonsmulighet på 
kort sikt i transportsektoren” 
English ”CO2-emissions in Norway have to come from fixed, direct use of fossil fuels 
or the transport sector. In a short-term perspective there is just a small 
possibility for substitute products in the transport sector” 
  
Footnote 
174, p. 64 
AT, arkivnr. 547.00, saksnr. 90/4725-8, manus foredrag Moe 29.08.1990 
Norwegian “Andre land kan oppnå betydelige reduksjoner i utslippene fra kullfyrte og 
oljefyret kraftverk til gassfyrte kraftverk” 
English ”...Other countries can achieve considerable reductions in the emissions from 
coal- or oil power plants by transferring to gas power plants” 
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Footnote 
178, p. 65 
AT, arkivnr. 547.00, saksnr. 90/4725-6, brev fra Md til Fd 03.07.1990 
Norwegian ”Md ønsker å utvide svovelavgiften til å omfatte koks og kull også. Md 
prioriterer dette forslaget fremfor en CO2 begrunnet avgift på kull og koks” 
English “The Ministry of the Environment wishes to extend the SO2 tax and include 
coal and coke. The Ministry of the Environment would prioritize this 
suggestion over a CO2 tax on coal and coke.“ 
  
Footnote 
182, p. 66 
PA 1988-1989, arkivboks nr. 11, arkivmappe 102.7 Gjennomførig av 
langtidsprogrammet, brev fra Ud til Fd 15.08.1989 
Norwegian ”...gass som blensel er et miljøvennlig alternativ til andre fossile brensler som 
kull og olje. Dette kan gjøre norsk gass til et interessant energialternativ til 
Europa i de kommende årene fremover” 
English ”...gas as a source of energy is an environmentally friendly alternative unlike 
other fossil fuels such as coal and oil. This can make Norwegian gas 
interesting as an alternative energy source in Europe in the future” 
  
Footnote 
189, p. 69 
PA, tidsrom 1990-1994, arkivboks nr. 15, arkivmappe 105.54 Miljøvern, brev 
fra  PA, Fd til Md 23.10.1990 
Norwegian ”Vil man ikke kunne oppnå mer ved å sterkere understreke/søke å få 
oppslutning om hva industrilandene i alle fall bør gjøre i de nærmeste år?”, og 
han fortsetter ” Hovedhensikten vil være å unngå en fastlåst diskusjon om 
langsiktige mål og å få USA (og andre nølere feks Storbritanina) til å gjøre 
mer enn de hittil har vært villige til å gjøre” 
English ”Would it be possible to achieve more by more strongly emphasizing/trying 
to gain support for what the industrial countries at the least should do in the 
years to come?”. He continues: ”The main aim would be to avoid a sticky 
discussion about long-term goals and to make the USA (and other laggards 
such as Great Britain) do more than they have wanted to do so far” 
  
Footnote 
190, p. 69 
PA, tidsrom 1990-1994, arkivboks nr. 15, arkivmappe 105.54 Miljøvern, brev 
fra PA, Fd til Md 23.10.1990 
Norwegian ”...føre-var-prinsippet og …kostnadseffektive  avtaler og virkemidler” 
English “The precautionary principle and cost effective agreements and instruments” 
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Footnote 
191, p. 70 
PA, tidsrom 1990-1994, arkivboks nr. 15, arkivmappe 105.54 Miljøvern, brev 
fra PA, Fd til Md 23.10.1990 
Norwegian - Utslippsmålsettingene må fastsettes på tvers av landegrensene 
- Avtalen må omfatte alle drivhusgasser, ikke bare CO2 
- Avtalen bør ha bred tilslutning, deriblant fra alle de store 
industrilandene.  
English First, “…limiting emissions must be set independent of borders”; second, 
“…the agreement must include all climate gasses, not just CO2”: third, “…the 
agreement should enjoy broad approval from all major industrial countries” 
  
Footnote 
193, p. 70 
PA, tidsrom 1990-1994, arkivboks nr. 15, arkivmappe 105.54 Miljøvern, brev 
fra PA, Fd til Md 23.10.1990 
Norwegian ”Miljøverndepartementet går inn for at Norge ikke skal gå mot et eventuelt 
forslag om at det igangsettes arbeid med et program for 20% reduksjon av 
industrilandenes samlede utslipp av drivhusgasser. Etter 
Finansdepartementets syn bør Norge i stedet foreslå en utredning av 
eventuelle reduksjoner i denne omgang” 
English “In the opinion of the Ministry of the Environment, Norway shall not oppose 
any suggestion that implement a programme with the aim of a 20% reduction 
in the total emissions of climate gases in the industrialized countries. The 
Ministry of Finance thinks Norway instead should suggest an investigation of 
possible reductions for now” 
  
Footnote 
194, p. 70 
PA, tidsrom 1990-1994, arkivboks nr. 15, arkivmappe 105.54 Miljøvern, brev 
fra PA, Fd til Md 23.10.1990 
Norwegian ”Det er ikke naturlig å ta realitetsstandpunkt til eventuelle reduksjonsmål før 
aktuelle utredninger herunder klimautredningen, er fullført og det foreligger 
anslag for kostnadene ved forskjellige utslippsmålsettinger. Disse kostnadene 
vil kunne bli meget betydelige og ha stor innflytelse på økonomisk vekst og 
samfunnsutvikling i Norge” 
English ”it is not possible to take a standpoint vis-à-vis possible reduction goals 
before the actual investigation, the climate investigation, has been completed 
and there is a calculation of the costs of different levels of reductions of 
emissions. These costs may soar and have an enormous influence on 
economic growth and societal development” 
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Footnote 
195, p. 71 
PA, tidsrom 1990-1994, arkivboks nr. 15, arkivmappe 105.54 Miljøvern, brev 
fra Sfd til Md 27.10.1990 
Norwegian ”I den grad Norge skal påta seg ”sekretæriatoppgaver” i det internasjonale 
miljøarbeidet bør dette på forhånd drøfes grundig på det politiske plan her 
hjemme. Dette har ikke vært tilfelle i denne konkrete saken” 
English ”The extent to which Norway is to be responsible for “secretarial tasks” in 
international environmental work should be discussed in advance at a political 
level here at home. That has not occurred in this specific case” 
  
Footnote 
196, p. 71 
PA, tidsrom 1990-1994, arkivboks nr. 15, arkivmappe 105.54 Miljøvern, brev 
fra Sfd til Md 27.10.1990 
Norwegian ”Vi vil også generelt påpeke åpenbare problemer som ligger i at Norge i 
realiteten har påtatt seg et sekretæriatansvar for ministerkonferansen på et 
område hvor vi har en rekke uavklarte politiske spørsmål nasjonalt. Det er en 
klar fare for at dette kan legge bindinger på og skape tvil om norske 
standpunkter til internasjonale klimaforhandlinger”. 
English “We would also like to address the obvious problems that lie in the fact that 
Norway in reality has assumed a secretarial responsibility for the ministerial 
conference in an area where numerous national political questions remain 
unclear. There is a clear danger that this could lead to obligations and create 
doubt about Norwegian standpoints in the international climate negotiations” 
  
Footnote 
198, p. 72 
PA, tidsrom 1990-1994, arkivboks nr. 15, arkivmappe 105.54 Miljøvern, brev 
fra Sfd til Md 27.10.1990 
Norwegian ”Samferdselsdepartementet vil be om at det i oversendelsesbrevet presiseres 
hvem som har utarbeidet det norske dokumentet. Vi vil be om at ordet ”we”, 
første gang, erstattes med ”The Ministry og Environment on cooperation with 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs” 
English ”The Ministry of Transport and Communications wants it to be expressed in 
the letter of recommendation who has formulated the Norwegian document. 
We would ask that the word “we”, the first time it is mentioned, be altered to 
„The Ministry of Environment in cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs‟” 
  
Footnote 
202, p. 74 
PA, tidsrom 1990-1993, arkivboks nr. 14, arkivmappe 102.40 Generelt, notat i 
PUA 20.09.1990 
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Norwegian ”Det er planlagt en referansebane som viser utslipp av klimagasser ved en 
balansert økonomisk vekst fram til 2025 uten ytterligere miljøtiltak. Denne 
banen baserers på nye oljeanslag fra Olje- og Energidepartementet og anslag 
for NB91. Utslippeberegningene for referansealternativet er under arbeid i 
SSB. Foreløpige resultater viser imidlertid at allerede vedtatte miljømål ikke 
nås uten ytterligere tiltak. Beregningene i Miljøavgiftsutvalget vil kunne 
bygge på KLØKT-beregningene...” 
English ”A line of reference is planned showing the emissions of climate gasses in a 
state of balanced economic growth until 2025 without further environmental 
steps. This line is based on new calculations for oil from the Ministry of 
Petroleum and Energy and calculations for NB91 (national budget: my 
comment). Preliminary results show that environmental goals which have 
already been decided on will not be achieved without further steps. The 
calculations of the Environmental Tax Committee will be based on KLØKT 
calculations…” 
  
Footnote 
203, p. 74 
PA, tidsrom 1990-1993, arkivboks nr. 14, arkivmappe 102.40 Generelt, notat i 
PUA 20.09.1990 
Norwegian ”Det vil ellers lett kunne oppstå vanskeligheter og misforståelser om hva 
Regjeringen faktisk legger til grunn i sitt arbeid med langsiktige 
problemstillinger, herunder miljøpolitikken” 
English ”difficulties will be avoided in terms of what the Government uses as basis 
for its long-term policy, including environmental politics,” 
  
Footnote 
213, p. 77 
PA, tidsrom 1990-1993, arkivboks nr. 2, arkivmappe 012.74 Klimautvalget, 
notat fra ØA og PA til finansråden via Moe 09.03.1990 
Norwegian ”Siden tiltaka mot utslepp av klimagassar kan ha vestentlege, 
makroøkonomiske konsekvensar, bør også Finansdepartement vera aktivt med 
i å utforma dei norske synspunkta til forhandlingane” 
English “Since efforts against climate gases may have considerable macroeconomic 
repercussions, the Ministry of Finance should also participate actively in 
developing the Norwegian point of view for the negotiations” 
  
Footnote 
214, p. 77 
FA Rad 4, seksjon 1, Kap. 1400-1499 MD (Miljøverndep) 1990-1997, 
arkivboks nr. 25 Miljøverndepartementet KAP 1470 Internasjonalt 
miljøvernsamarbeid, telefax fra Oed til Fd 17.10.1991 
Norwegian ”På grunn av den sterke veksten i CO2 utslippene vil en internasjonal avtale 
som bygger på harmonisering være langt å foretrekke fremfor nasjonale 
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stabiliserings programmer. Det vil gjøre det mulig for Norge i betydelig grad 
å øke våre utslipp i tråd med våre komparative nasjonale produksjonsfortrinn” 
English  ”Because of the strong growth in CO2-emissions, an international agreement 
founded on a harmonization (of regulations: my comment) would indeed be 
preferable instead of national stabilization programmes. It will then be 
possible for Norway, at a considerable growth rate, to increase our emissions 
in line with our superior national comparative advantages” 
  
Footnote 
217, p. 78 
FA Rad 4, seksjon 1, Kap. 1400-1499 MD (Miljøverndep) 1990-1997, 
arkivboks nr. 25 Miljøverndepartementet KAP 1470 Internasjonalt 
miljøvernsamarbeid, internt notat fra FA til str via Moe, Finansråden, PA, 
ATA, SØ 20.09.1991 
Norwegian - ”Avgifter og andre virkenidler skal koordineres mellom land 
- Oppfyllelse av  utslippsforpliktelser må kunne skje i samarbeid 
mellom forskjellige land og ved tiltak ovenfor foskjellige klimagasser. 
- Det foreslås etablert enspesiell mekanisme, er ”clearling house” for å 
legge forholdene til rette for slikt samarbeid.  
English first, “taxation and other instruments have to be coordinated with other 
countries”; second, “the fulfillment of obligations to reduce emission must 
occur in cooperation with different countries and by taking steps against 
various climate gasses”; third, “ a certain mechanism is suggested, a “clearing 
house”, to ensure the possibility of such cooperation” 
  
Footnote 
219, p. 79 
FA Rad 4, seksjon 1, Kap. 1400-1499 MD (Miljøverndep) 1990-1997, 
arkivboks nr. 25 Miljøverndepartementet KAP 1470 Internasjonalt 
miljøvernsamarbeid, internt notat fra til str via Moe, Finansråden, PA, ATA, 
SØ 20.09.1991 
Norwegian ”...den viktigste substansen i de norske forslagene” 
English ”most important substance in the Norwegian suggestions” 
  
Footnote 
222, p. 80 
FA Rad 4, seksjon 1, Kap. 1400-1499 MD (Miljøverndep) 1990-1997, 
arkivboks nr. 25 Miljøverndepartementet KAP 1470 Internasjonalt 
miljøvernsamarbeid, internt notat fra FA til str via Moe, Finansråden, PA, 
ATA, SØ  20.09.1991 
Norwegian ”...Pr i dag synes det ikke urimelig å anta at den viktigste substansen i de 
norske forslagene vil kunne bli reflektert i konvensjonen. Dette vil bl. a. 
innebære at Norge vil ha frihet til å oppfylle sin stabiliseringsmålsetting 
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gjennom investeringer i utlandet fremfor  tiltak for å redusere innenlandske 
utslipp” 
English ”...as of today it does not seem unreasonable to assume that the most 
important substance in the Norwegian suggestions is to be reflected in the 
convention. This will imply in part that Norway will have the freedom to 
fulfill its goal of stabilization by virtue of investments abroad rather than 
action nationally to reduce emissions” 
  
Footnote 
226, p. 80 
FA Rad 4, seksjon 1, Kap. 1400-1499 MD (Miljøverndep) 1990-1997, 
arkivboks nr. 25 Miljøverndepartementet KAP 1470 Internasjonalt 
miljøvernsamarbeid, brev fra Hanisch til Md 22.10.1991 
Norwegian ” Hensikten med seminaret er  å legge fram og få diskutert i en viss bredde, 
det norsk eforslaget om et ”clearing house” som en del av finansierings-
mekanismen under Klimakonvensjoen” 
English ”the aim of the seminar is to lay open and discuss broadly, to a certain extent, 
the Norwegian suggestion of a “clearing house” as part of the financial 
mechanism of the Climate Convention” 
  
Footnote 
229, p. 81 
Rom 6, FA Rad 4, seksjon 1, Kap. 1400-1499 MD (Miljøverndep) 1990-1997, 
arkivboks nr. 25 Miljøverndepartementet KAP 1470 Internasjonalt 
miljøvernsamarbeid, telefax fra FN-delegasjonen til ressursavdelingen i Ud 
24.02.1992. 
Norwegian ”På Norsk side må vi konstatere en negativ utvikling i forhold til vårt 
forhandlingsopplegg” og de fortsetter; ”... forslaget om felles gjennomføring 
synes ikke å seile i medvind. India som hittil har vært den største støtten, 
synes forslaget er blitt mer bilateralt etter at Tyskland lanserte sin versjon av 
felles gjennomføring på forrige møte” 
English ”As far as the Norwegian side is concerned, we must state that there is a 
negative development regarding our negotiations…” They continued: “…the 
suggestion concerning joint implementation does not seem to have any wind 
in its sails. India that had previously lent support, believes the suggestion has 
become bilateral since Germany launched its version of joint implementation 
at the last meeting” 
  
 
 
 
